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I. INTRODUCTION
"All real living is meeting."
- Martin Buber'
In his excellent but troubling book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Revival ofAmerican Community, sociologist Robert Putnam describes in great
detail the decline in participation by Americans in community activities. Putnam
traces how reduced participation in civic organizations, social clubs, charitable
organizations, and the like have diminished our store of social capital and with
it, our civic connectedness. 2 Social capital-the connections between
individuals that build social networks-is seen as critical to the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that allow us to function as a civil society. 3 The
term "bowling alone" uses the decline in participation in organized bowling
leagues as a metaphor for the decline in civic life and the interconnectedness of
Americans. 4
The fragmentation of American society has been a frequent theme of
communitarian discourse in recentyears. 5 Common to these commentaries is
the notion that the social bonds of our society are in need of shoring up, that our
preoccupation with individual rights and economic self-maximization has
caused us to neglect the social nature of our existence, and that we therefore
must recognize common values that bind us into a community that is more than
1 MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU I I (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., Charles Scribner's Sons
2d ed. 1958).
2 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
3 Id. at 19-20.
4 Id. at 15-28; 111-13.
5 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) [hereinafter GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK]; AMITAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF
COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993)
[hereinafter ETZIONI, SPIRIT]; ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2d ed. 1996); Robert M. Ackerman,
Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 649 (1995).
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the sum of its parts.6 In an increasingly rights-conscious society,
communitarians recognize the need to nourish social virtues as well as
individual rights in order to preserve the social framework. 7
Some commentators have identified the litigiousness of American society as
a major culprit in the overindulgence of individual rights. Indeed, a good case
can be made that the overuse of the courts has created an exaggerated sense of
rights-consciousness, to the detriment of community needs. 8 But it is the central
thesis of this paper that our systems of conflict resolution-both formal and
informal--can play important roles in advancing communitarian ideals. The
array of devices, public and private, for the pacific resolution of conflict can be
consciously employed to enhance social participation and strengthen a sense of
community, while maintaining respect for individual autonomy. 9
Some conflict resolution processes, like negotiation and mediation, are
inherently collaborative. 10 These processes ideally require the parties to engage
6 The public response to the tragedy of September 11, 2001 might provide some
reassurance; the surge in blood donations, volunteer efforts, and patriotic spirit suggests a
latent spirit of community that has become potent at a time of crisis. In a follow-up survey
conducted from mid-October to mid-November 2001, Putnam found higher levels of political
consciousness and engagement and "evidence of enhanced trust across ethnic and other
social divisions." Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Together, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Feb. 11,
2002), available at http://www.prospect.org/print/Vl 3/3/putnam-r.html. But Putnam also
reports that while "occasional volunteering is up slightly, ... regular
volunteering ... remains unchanged." Id. He therefore wonders "how thoroughly and
enduringly have American values and civic habits been transformed by the terrorist attacks."
Id. "Changes in attitude alone, no matter how promising, do not constitute civic renewal." Id.
7 See AMITAI ETzioNI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE 4 (1996) [hereinafter ETZIONI, GOLDEN
RULE]. In an earlier work, Etzioni described communitarianism as "a social movement
aim[ed] at shoring up the moral, social, and political environment" without plunging into "a
dark tunnel of moralism and authoritarianism." ETzIoNI, SPIRIT, supra note 5, at 247. He
proposed a four point agenda, consisting of(1) a moratorium on the manufacturing of new
rights, (2) the notion that rights presume responsibilities, (3) a recognition that certain
responsibilities may exist without an immediate payback in the form ofcapturable rights, and
(4) "careful adjustments" to reconcile individual rights with the public welfare. Id. at 4-11;
see also Ackerman, supra note 5, at 652-54. Still earlier, Professor Baruch Bush explained
that "[t]he 'communitarian theory' of society claims to avoid both the individual excesses of
liberalism and the collective excesses of welfarism by stressing the central role of community
as a personal and social good and as a mediating structure between the individual and the
society as a whole." Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shififrom Individual
to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473, 1530
(1986).
8 See generally GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5.
9 See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 684-90.
10 Commentators have used terms like "competitive," "cooperative," and "collaborative"
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in constructive discourse resulting in a reconciliation of interests. In some
instances, collaborative, consensus-building processes have at their core the idea
of building community support for public policy initiatives or community
projects. In other instances, the parties to a dispute may have more modest
substantive goals, but may nevertheless acknowledge the interdependence of
human beings and the need for collaboration. Transformative mediation, for
example, strives to forge bonds between people through empowerment (with an
emphasis on maturity and responsibility, rather than self-aggrandizement) and
recognition (i.e., the acknowledgment of legitimate interests and attributes in
others)."1 And while much mediation is not explicitly transformative, the
mediation process, at its best, requires that the parties engage in an exchange
leading to an accommodation of their respective and mutual interests.
Substantively, mediation is particularly useful in areas-such as workplace,
neighborhood and family relations-in which the reduction of strife is critical to
the maintenance of community.
Properly employed, even adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms can
build a sense of community. Arbitration-which, at its outset, requires that the
parties agree upon rules of engagement-is most widely and effectively used in
the workplace and among merchants as a means of maintaining community
norms while giving voice to individual grievances, at the same time keeping
disruptions to a minimum. And litigation emerged, centuries ago, as a civilized
means of extending commonly held norms to all individual claims through the
genteel practices of an organized bar subscribing to a common code of conduct.
Regrettably, systems of conflict resolution can also serve as barriers to
community building. The procedural nuances of litigation and arbitration can be
manipulated to stifle meaningful discourse among the disputants. Formal
dispute resolution processes can evolve into empty ritual, with little substantive
meaning for the participants. Bargaining in negotiation and mediation can
proceed strictly in an adversarial, distributive manner in which the parties
become locked in a death-grip over limited resources. Mediation can also be
transmogrified into a largely evaluative and even coercive process in which
there is little direct communication between the parties and self-determination is
compromised. 12 And even facilitative mediation, with its emphasis on interests,
to classify different negotiation strategies. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based
Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 43 (1985). But at its
essence, negotiation (and its assisted cousin, mediation) is collaborative in a way that
adjudicative processes rarely are.
11 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 84-94 (1994).
12 See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice
Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 805-09 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Making
Deals]; Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
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can cause parties to dwell upon their own interests in a self-indulgent manner.
To bring communitarian values into disputing requires more than a push-button
choice of process; it requires conscious use of process in a manner conducive to
personal interaction, mutual recognition, and a sense that the parties and their
dispute are part of a larger tapestry. Like good jazz, effective conflict resolution
requires more than individuals playing the notes; musicians or disputants must
consciously work together to produce good music or genuine accord.
The use of dispute resolution processes and techniques conducive to the
building of community is the subject of this article. It will explore, in Section II,
the desirability of employing processes and techniques to manage conflict in a
manner conducive to the building of community, and in Section III, the use of
conflict resolution systems to build and maintain social capital. Section IV will
thereafter examine various conflict resolution processes and techniques,
elaborating upon the following themes regarding the relationship between
dispute resolution processes and the advancement of community:
" As a general rule, consensual processes, such as negotiation and
mediation, are preferable to adjudicative processes, such as litigation
and arbitration, in the building of community. In a consensual process
the parties, usually through direct participation, attempt to collaborate
in order to reconcile their interests and arrive at a solution from which
they can derive mutual benefit. In some (but not all) such cases, the
overall benefit exceeds that which would have been achieved through
the litigation process (or through avoidance), with significant spillover
benefits to the community at large. Sometimes the benefits are in the
form of win-win substantive solutions; in other instances, they are
inherent in the process itself in the form of enhanced communication;
empowerment; and recognition of legitimate rights, feelings, and
interests in others.
* Not all consensual processes are collaborative, nor do they all yield
results superior to that of litigation. Collaboration is difficult,
particularly in the context of conflict. As a consequence, settlements
often are negotiated (and even mediated) without the active
participation of the principals. Compromises are reached and money is
exchanged, but the parties emerge with little satisfaction that their
interests have been served, much less maximized. Sometimes mediation
is co-opted into an evaluative, zero-sum game so that it more closely
resembles the adversarial processes it is designed to replace than a
collaborative process that admittedly requires greater effort. Sometimes
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 7-14
(2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision].
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settlements are coerced. Sometimes parties become fixated on their
selfish interests to the exclusion of other considerations.
* Adjudicative processes can, at times, be conducive to the building of
community. The abstract legal principles that serve as the basis of
decision-making are, presumably, derived from the community's idea
of justice. The disputants' willingness to submit their dispute to
adjudication by a recognized tribunal is itself an affirmation of
community, far more so than the self-help remedies of the blood feud,
duel, or riot. Religious communities, trade associations, and the like
have established systems of arbitration to strengthen and maintain
bonding capital. But we delude ourselves if we think that adjudicative
dispute resolution processes can serve as a surrogate for the types of
community bonds that can be forged only in the absence of coercion.
* Systems of adjudication also require a measure of collaboration.
Opposing counsel must deal with one another as they work through
discovery and pretrial, and they, as well as their respective clients, are
most likely to benefit when the process unfolds with a reasonable level
of courtesy and cooperation among counsel. Whether negotiating or
litigating, lawyers at their best use the bonding social capital of the
profession-formed through the acculturation of law school and
practice, and commonly accepted norms of behavior-to create
bridging social capital between their clients and among members of the
community who observe the litigation process. Lawyers who forget
this-and adopt an antagonistic posture toward their fellow
practitioners--overlook the very basis for the special privileges
conferred on their profession.
" While bonding social capital has its dark side, evidenced by such
pernicious organizations as the Ku Klux Klan and German Nazi Party,
individuals, organizations, and even nations are best positioned to build
bridging social capital when their bonding social capital, and therefore
their confidence and self-esteem, is strong. Transformative mediation,
which uses empowerment of the disputants and mutual recognition of
legitimate interests to build better relationships, employs an approach
consistent with this premise.
Because lawyers so often serve as primary gatekeepers for conflict
resolution processes, we will also discuss how relationships among lawyers may
build social capital (primarily in Section IV.A.3) and the role of lawyers with
respect to process choices made by disputants (in Section V). We will then
conclude (in Section VI) by asking whether process alone is sufficient to build
community, or whether real community requires an underlying repository of
values and ongoing social interaction, a sharing of interests which creative use
of processes can draw upon, but cannot supplant.
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1I. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT BUILDING COMMUNITY THROUGH
DISPUTE RESOLUTION?
"We cannot live only for ourselves. A thousand fibers connect us with our
fellow men."
- Herman Melville 13
Why should we encourage those embroiled in disputes to seek out methods
of conflict resolution that will enhance community? Is it fair to ask those
engaged in conflict to think about the welfare of the larger community while
attempting to resolve what might be the greatest crises of their lives? Or is it
oppressive to impose such an agenda on people who are justifiably preoccupied
with their own problems?
A. Disputes with Public Implications
Certain disputes have implications of such public impact that the answers to
these questions are apparent. These disputes operate on what we might call the
"macro" level; that is, the disputes, in terms of both process and outcome, have
an effect on the community as a whole. Some of these disputes involve public
bodies, like governments, and involve broad public interests by definition.' 4
Disputes that enter the criminal justice system might all fall under this category,
because it is that system to which we turn to deal with behavior that disrupts the
orderly functioning of the community. Other disputes-for example, those
involving land use or environmental issues-while ostensibly private, may have
a broad substantive effect on the community.' 5 The interest of the community in
13 Brainyquote, at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/h/q 100853.html.
14 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (dispute over Florida vote count in
presidential election); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (dispute
involving State of New Jersey, private landfill owners in New Jersey, and various cities over
disposition of various solid/liquid wastes originating outside of New Jersey);Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Steel Seizure Case); see also Janet C.
Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers
Happy--For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 259 (1996) (discussion of Umatilla River Basin
controversy and subsequent mediation).
15 Perhaps some of the best examples are cases filed pursuant to the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). See, e.g., Concerned Area
Residents for the Env't v. Southwest Farms, 34 F.3d 114 (1994) (runoff pollution resulting
from concentrated animal feeding); Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24
F. 3d 962 (1994) (establishment of a distribution center that is indirect source of air/ground
pollution by increased vehicle traffic); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428
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matters like these is obvious, and there is a growing body of literature on
whether and how to involve the community, beyond the immediate parties to the
conflict, 16 in the dispute resolution process.
B. Private Disputes
But many disputes are private not only in appearance, but in fact. A
commercial dispute between two corporations, a property division between a
divorcing husband and wife, or a tort claim for an isolated injury may have little
or no substantive impact beyond the disputing parties. These "micro" disputes
may nevertheless have implications for communitarianism. First, insofar as they
involve a publicly supported dispute resolution system (e.g., the courts 17), there
are public implications. The public finances the court system and, given the
relatively small filing fees charged by the courts, subsidizes the parties'
disputing activity.' 8 The law pertaining to the public at large, whether a creation
(1993) (discharge of pollutants into groundwater). Other examples include decisions related
to issues of ripeness and standing in environmental disputes. See also, e.g.,' Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (issue of ripeness in regulatory taking claim); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Contemporary public
concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.").
16 A great deal of this literature discusses various community and restorative justice
programs operating within the criminal justice system. Such programs seek to address the
underlying issues in the dispute and resolve it through a process involving the victim,
offender, members of the criminal justice system and the community. See, e.g., Gretchen
Ulrich, Widening the Circle: Adapting Traditional Indian Dispute Resolution Methods to
Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice in Modern Communities,
20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 419 (1999). Much attention has also been centered on
involving the public in environmental regulation and policy. See, e.g., Eileen Guana, The
Environmental Justice Misfit. Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of various public participation
models); Patrick J. Skelley II, Public Participation in Brownfield Remediation Systems:
Putting the Community Back on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 389 (1997)
(discussing a local zoning based model or public participation in hazardous waste cleanup
and land development). For more general commentary on problems of inclusion, see David
Laws, Representation of Stakeholding Interests, in THE CONSENsus BUILDING HANDBOOK
241,263-69 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
Note that many disputes with broad substantive ramifications present themselves
ostensibly as private disputes: a few individuals bring a nuisance action against an alleged
polluter; an employee brings a discrimination claim against a large employer; an injured
person brings a product design defect claim against a manufacturer.
17 Along with the courts, we should include the many administrative agencies on the
national, state, and local level that perform adjudicative functions.
18 See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative
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of the legislature or the judiciary, is implicated and sometimes altered through
the adjudication of private disputes. Because a publicly supported forum serves
as the default mechanism when the relationship between private disputants
breaks down, 19 the public has a legitimate interest in the process and, in some
instances, the outcome of these disputes. Particularly at times in which
substantial public resources must be diverted to confront national emergencies
of overriding importance, we can ill-afford the abuse of public dispute
resolution fora through either the processing of substantively dubious or petty
claims or the use of procedural devices that consume resources without
providing commensurate substantive dividends. 20
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366,392-93 (1986).
19 Even where the parties have employed a private process, such as mediation, a public
process (most often the court system) serves as a default mechanism. The very existence of a
governmentally-sponsored mechanism to which disputants can resort (and into which one
disputant can force a reluctant adversary), and which can impose a resolution on the
disputants, is the very engine that drives the private processes. As others have described it:
"the threat of legal processes helps to mobilize informal consensual justice." Sally Engle
Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept ofDispute, 9
JUST. Sys. 151, 153 (1984) (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in
Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11
(1984)).
20 Post-September 11 th conduct on the part of lawyers and litigants indicates that at
least some disputants have acknowledged this reality. The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, for example, urged, on September 12, 2001, "a moratorium on civil lawsuits that
might arise out of these awful events" of the previous day. Leo V. Boyle, A National
Tragedy: ATLA Joins Nation in Mourning, Calls for Moratorium in this Time of Crisis on
Civil Lawsuits that May Arise from Tragedy, at http://www.atla.org/homepage/tragedy.ht
(Sept. 12, 2001).
But silly cases persist, even at a time when people ought to know better. For example, as
of December 2001, two baseball fans were locked in litigious combat over ownership of the
baseball Giants outfielder Barry Bonds hit for his record-setting 73rd home run.
Only in America could a Popov sue a Hayashi over a bobble from a game... [with a]
decision.., made by Judge David Garcia .... There is no evidence that either Popov or
Hayashi love Bonds' ball, desire Bonds' ball, want Bonds' ball. They only want
whatever Bonds' ball can bring on the open market.
Frank Deford, Solution to Who Caught Barry Bonds' Record-Setting Home Run Ball
(National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 5, 2001).
Communitarians might be equally concerned with opportunistic legislative efforts
to limit tort remedies-and insulate from liability parties genuinely fault-that have
gained ground since September 11. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety & System
Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001); Terrorism Risk Protection
Act, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001); David E. Rovella, Ashcroft Rule Puts Defenders in
a Bind, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A1; Steven Labaton, Added Rush on Revising Tort
System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at C1.
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The greatest threat posed by the abuse of the public disputing process,
however, is not to the courts as institutions themselves. The courts can
withstand a good deal of silliness in the processing of civil disputes, judging by
their capacity to deal with the antisocial behaviors they must regularly confront
on the criminal side of the docket. Frivolous civil claims and defenses may
occupy a court's time, and incivility among counsel may try its patience. But
courts expend a more significant amount of time and energy tending to the
criminal docket.21 Criminal cases by their very nature involve allegations of
anti-social behavior that is destructive to the community. The courts-together
with law enforcement personnel, and, increasingly, people involved in
restorative j ustice22-serve as society's principal mechanisms for coping with
such behavior. While the courts may perform imperfectly in administering this
system, any institution accustomed to processing this antisocial behavior on a
daily basis can withstand occasional hyperbolic civil pleading or want of civility
on the part of some lawyers, however regrettable. Far more destructive than the
consequences for the courts as institutions is the wear and tear on the parties and
the public and private institutions surrounding them-families, neighborhoods,
businesses, and not-for-profit organizations. 23 So too we will observe the
21 From 1996 to 2000, criminal case filings (including transfers) per authorized federal
district judgeship grew 30 percent. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS: 2000, 13 (2001), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/front/2000artext.pdf. During the twelve-month period
ending September 30, 2000, "[flilings of criminal cases ... and the number of
defendants... reach[ed] the highest totals since 1933, when the Prohibition Amendment was
repealed." Id. at 18.
22 Restorative justice recognizes that "[b]ecause crime is more than lawbreaking,
'justice' cannot be achieved simply by punishing or treating the offender, but requires a focus
on reparation and healing in the aftermath of the offense that seeks to involve victims and
communities actively in the justice process." Gordon Bazemore, In Search of a
Communitarian Justice Alternative: Youth Crime and the Sanctioning Response as a Case
Study, in To PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE 127, 129 (David E. Carney ed., 1999). This
"community hand-on [sic]" approach rejects the historical view that societal accountability is
achieved through individualized, retributive punishments to the offender. Id. at 130, 149.
Instead, restorative sanctions are designed to obtain "behavioral, material, emotional, and
cognitive benefits for victims, offenders, and community members." Id. at 149. This
objective communicates to the victims "that the system views them as important and values
their involvement[,] ... [to] the community that promoting victim restoration and community
peace and safety is a top priority[,] ... [and to the offenders] that they are capable of and
responsible for making amends for the harm caused by their crimes... "Id.
23 For example, the rancor generated by an October, 2001 strike by public employees in
Minnesota was exacerbated by concern that such conduct by public servants at a time of
national emergency would have a detrimental effect on public morale. Strike in Minnesota
Ends as State and Unions Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,2001, at A 14 (discussing how strikers
had drawn only "tepid support from the usually pro-labor public because of its timing after
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fragmentation of society if the legal process is used as a ploy to divide people
rather than bring them together, or at least resolve their conflicts with as little
friction as possible.
C. The Desire for Community
The efforts of individuals to resolve their disputes and the desire to reinforce
the societal fabric are, more often than not, compatible goals. We search for
community in the course of conflict not so much because it is imposed upon us
or because of some artificial dictate. In a free country, community doesn't seek
us. Community is what we seek.24 When we employ a dispute resolution
process, such as litigation, we use it in part to obtain a concrete result, such as
financial compensation. But we also invoke the process (and this may be more
true of public than private processes) to obtain the community's blessing on our
cause: a recognition -of its justice, a ratification of our course of action, a
vindication, be it public or private. 25 Even when private processes, such as
mediation and arbitration, are employed, parties are likely to emerge most
satisfied when they have been given "voice" (i.e., when they have been
sufficiently heard), and when they have been treated as fully enfranchised
members of the community. 26 We sue because we feel that we have been
the September 11 terrorist attacks").
24
Community is important for two reasons: it is the key to social well-being and
psychological health. Both society and the individual will fall apart unless some
measure of community is achieved. Community is the essence of the social bond: it
binds one person to another, transforming aggregates of individuals into coherent social
groups.
WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE NEW FREEDOM, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN THE
SOCIAL LIVES OF AMERICANS 8 (1990).
25 "[T]ort plaintiffs in ordinary and mass tort litigation bring the same 'legal
consciousness' to their disputes as the individuals whom Sally Merry (1990) observed in her
studies of neighborhood and family disputes: a desire to vindicate rights.. . and a sense of
entitlement to use the legal system." Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation,
in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 162 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998)
(citing SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990)).
Whether or not the system actually fulfills these aspirations is questionable. See Hensler,
supra at 155-56, 162-71.
26 "[P]erceptions of procedural justice are enhanced to the extent that disputants
perceive that they had the opportunity to present their views, concerns, and evidence to a
third party and had control over this presentation ("opportunity for voice"). Welsh, Making
Deals, supra note 12, at 820; see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 242 (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
wronged, that our world has been knocked out of balance, and we wish to
restore a sense of harmony to our lives and our relationships with those who
surround us.27 We employ collaborative processes like mediation not just as
instrumental means to obtain compensation or dispose of a dispute, but ideally
as a way of reestablishing discourse with our adversaries and bringing closure to
conflict.2 8 We engage in conflict as a way of righting ourselves with the world.
It is precisely because we are in conflict, in crisis (having been wronged or
unjustly accused of wrongdoing), that we seek out devices and solutions that
restore balance to our lives. And because we are social animals, balance
involves our relationship with the community that surrounds us.29
. True, people often engage in disputes for selfish motives, and in recent
years there have been ample accounts of Americans employing the courts and
other dispute resolution mechanisms to advance interests seemingly at odds with
those of the public.30 Some of these cases have achieved mythological
proportions, serving as heuristics that belie the man-bites-dog nature of their
Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38
ADMIN. Sch Q. 224,247 (1993). The inherent value of "voice" is explained in part by group
value theory; i.e., disputants are concerned about their standing as full members of society,
and their assessments of their standing is dependent upon the way in which group authorities
treat them. "To the extent that decision-making procedures are structured to reassure
disputants that they are valued members of society-and thus included in 'the group'-such
procedures are more likely to be perceived as procedurally just." Welsh, Making Deals,
supra note 13, at 828; see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive:
The Antecedents ofDistributive Justice and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 850, 850-58 (1994).
27 "We are not the autonomous, lonely individuals celebrated by liberal democracy. We
are connected to and dependent on one another." THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 73 (1994).
28 Community mediators report that many agreements are motivated in part by a
realization that the disputants will continue to live alongside one another as neighbors, and
that there is a social aspect to their relationship. Discussion with Neighborhood Dispute
Settlement volunteer mediators, in Harrisburg, Pa. (Nov. 15, 2001).
29 "Social life ... is produced by competent actors shaping their actions in accordance
with local systems of rules and conventions." ROM HARRt, SOCIAL BEING 237 (2d ed. 1993).
30 Some of these lawsuits are downright silly. See, e.g., Coyle v. Purolator Armored,
Inc., 729 F.2d 1446 (3d Cir. 1984) (unpublished opinion dismissing claim against armored
truck company by man who had been convicted of taking cash that had fallen out of armored
truck); Matos, Jr. v. Rivera, Jr., 648 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (suit against pizza parlor
by man who had stolen parlor's delivery truck, which he crashed, injuring himself); Mark v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 496 P.2d 1276 (Cal. 1972) (action by trespasser against owner of
premises which had not been rendered safe for their use); see also note 21, supra. There is a
seemingly endless supply of such cases, which proves only that (1) some lawyers will take on
most anything, (2) Lincoln was right when he said, "You can fool some of the people all of
the time."
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sometimes-extraordinary claims or inflated jury verdicts.31 Even discounting for
this, there will no doubt be instances in which people will attempt to abuse
dispute resolution processes or extract more than their share ofjustice or equity
from the system. Americans are a diverse lot, and just as many of us will
celebrate community (and embrace it at times of crisis), others will view it as
their inalienable right to pursue their interests and enjoy their privacy unfettered
by obligations to others.32 Members of other societies are amused-and
sometimes appalled-at Americans' preoccupation with individual rights, and
our readiness to resort to the courts to assert them.33 But the empirical evidence
suggests that most Americans will go to great lengths to avoid formal conflict,
and that when they do, they will most often seek out the shortest route between
the initiation of conflict and its termination. 34 And when Americans employ
31 A prominent example: The $2.9 million verdict to a woman who had spilled hot
McDonald's coffee on her lap, reduced by the court to $480,000. McDonald's Settles Out of
Court Over Coffee Burns, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 5, 1994, at 4. The initial jury award
was widely used as an example of excessive jury verdicts requiring legislative reform; the
subsequent remittitur went virtually unnoticed. See, e.g., Nancy Mathis, House OKs Limits to
Civil Suit Damages, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1995, at Al (discussing "Contract with
America" as an approach to ending "excessive jury awards such as the $2.9 million in
punitive damages awarded to an 81 year-old woman who spilled McDonald's coffee on her
lap").
32 1 am reminded of the New Yorker cover depicting scores of city-dwellers admiring a
fireworks display together on their rooftops while a solitary neighbor takes in the same
spectacle on his living room television set. THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1999, at cover.
33 1 recently returned from Vienna, where I had the pleasure of teaching a course on the
American legal system to a group of well-educated, highly motivated students from Central
and Eastern Europe. My students were especially curious about Americans' fascination with
firearms, and viewed our insistence on the right to bear arms as an example of the elevation
of individual "rights" over the public welfare. (Our refusal to dispense with the death penalty
was viewed, however, as an anomaly in the other direction.) They were also cognizant of
historical differences, acknowledging, for example, that Austria's disastrous experience with
National Socialism justified the suppression of hate speech in a manner perhaps unnecessary
in the United States. But the impression of the United States as a litigious nation remains. As
one student wrote on an examination, "[T]here seems to be a tendency in the United States to
claim individual or constitutional rights faster[sic] and more often than in Austria."
34 A 1992 survey of 822 American adults found only two percent of the respondents
expressed an initial impulse to litigate when involved in a disagreement. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, QUANTITATIVE BENCHMARK SURVEY 6 (1992).
As to the avoidance of court, one commentator has said, "|I]n a nation in which trial and
pretrial procedures are unusually expensive, in which litigation is unusually risky, in which
delays are long, and in which the first goal of many judges is to avoid judging, Americans
have not rushed to the courts in unusual numbers." Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a
Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in
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dispute resolution processes, such conduct often can be seen as an affirmation of
community values, an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the institutions and
processes invoked and the substantive rules employed when the processes are
adjudicative. 35 In some respects, a lack of community engagement may be
evidenced by a tendency to* conflict avoidance, not the willingness to
acknowledge conflict where it exists and have it resolved through formal or
informal processes grounded in community institutions. 36
Communitarians have an interest in how people view and respond to
problems in their lives. Do we act as self-absorbed, individuated units, or are we
conscious of the rights, interests and feelings of others, and therefore responsive
Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817 (1986).
As to settlement short of trial, another has said what most of us have long understood:
"High settlement rates mean that most cases never reach trial." John Burrit McArthur, Inter-
Branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L.
REV. 551, 579 n.92 (1999). "' [S]tatistical studies' demonstrate that approximately ninety-five
percent of all civil cases are resolved or otherwise terminated without a trial." Id. (citing
Louis Harris & Assocs., "Procedural Reform of the Civil Justice System (study conducted for
The Foundation for Change, March 1989)" at 6, reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Hearings before the Committee of the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess., 91-184 (1990)).
For a general survey of the above points see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
In some communities, resort to "outsiders" to resolve conflict is "roundly condemned."
Merry & Silbey, supra note 1919, at 173. In a report on a survey of three neighborhoods in a
small New England city, the authors concluded that "the decision to turn to official third
parties is situationally and morally constrained ... These findings suggest that the notion of
Americans as litigious, eager to rush into court with every trivial incident and personal
problem, is wrong." Id. at 172.
35 Professor Glendon comments:
In societies where the common sense of community is expressed in various
customary, religious, or conventional understandings, it would be redundant to pile
legal sanctions on top of social ones. In heterogeneous modem states, however,
common values are harder to identify, while law and its official enforcement
apparatus are more universal and highly developed than other forms of social
regulation. Nowhere is this more so than in the United States. Whether meant to be
or not, law is now regarded by many Americans as the principal carrier of those
few moral understandings that are widely shared by our diverse citizenry.
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5, at 87. To place Professor Glendon's comment in
context, it is only fair to acknowledge her general concern regarding the pervasive role of
law and lawyers in American society. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS (1994) [hereinafter GLENDON, NATION].
36 Conflict avoidance can be almost as anti-social as the fomenting of conflict. This is
not to suggest that we should turn every little grievance or petty annoyance into a formal
dispute. Neither society nor our nervous systems could long endure if we did.
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to them?37 It is not as though communitarians wish to serve as thought police,
banishing every selfish notion from people's minds. But there is a legitimate
interest in encouraging people to recognize that they are interconnected with
one another, that they are part of a larger whole, so that society may remain not
only free, but intact.38 "Disputes ... are social processes embedded in social
relations," declares Jerold S. Auerbach. "They express personality and culture;
they are not disembodied abstractions." 39 Efforts to resolve disputes in a civil
manner can contribute to the building of social capital necessary for civic life to
thrive, even at an interpersonal, "micro" level.
40
When accord cannot be reached on substance there is value, both for
individual disputants and the community at large, in maintaining civil discourse
even on those matters that divide us. Afternoon television "talk" shows may
provide amusement to the type of people who are attracted to train wrecks, but
the public could not withstand a world in which private disputes were routinely
addressed through the pulling of hair and the throwing of chairs, accompanied
by the catcalls of a studio audience. Better models are needed and available. The
criminal justice and tort systems evolved as responses to an intolerable level of
violence in breach of "the king's peace." 41 Today we might speak of a "citizens'
peace"--a mode of engaging in conflict deemed tolerable in a civilized
community. The manner in which people go about resolving their private
disputes is therefore of interest to communitarians, not so much from a
37 Important to the discussion of communitarianism is the acknowledgment of
collectivistic and individualistic social patterns. One social psychologist says:
Collectivism may be initially defined as a social pattern consisting of closely linked
individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers,
tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those
collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own
personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these
collectives ... [I]ndividualism is a social pattern that consists of loosely linked
individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily motivated
by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with
others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others; and emphasize
rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.
HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995).
38 "Buried deep in our rights dialect," laments communitarian Mary Ann Glendon, "is
an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively
have no obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of harm." GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5, at 77.
39 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 119 (1983).
40 See PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 288-95.
41 CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
214-18(1980).
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regulatory standpoint, but from the viewpoint of those interested in preserving
civil discourse and recognizing the interdependence of humanity. 42 Like a
molecular bond, each conflict represents a strand of social capital that is either
torn or repaired, depending on not just the result, but the process utilized for its
resolution. An entire range of dispute resolution processes, ranging from
negotiation to trial, 43 allows parties to disagree, with or without being
unnecessarily disagreeable. And the role of public institutions in private
disputing, along with the spillover effects of private disputes on the community,
gives the public at large a legitimate interest in the regulation of disputing
conduct.
D. Balancing Public Interest with Individual Autonomy
The foregoing assertions probably do not mean that disputants should be
commandeered into placing community values foremost, in derogation of
legitimate self-interest. People involved in disputes are often (though not
always) facing personal crisis, and it would be unfair to demand that they place
a broad community agenda ahead of their own. 44 Communitarians support
42 At certain stages of conflict, citizen intervention without the strong arm of
government may be the only way to maintain the peace. Says one advocate of community
mediation:
The community mediation movement appropriately placed prevention and early
intervention responsibilities on citizens and organizations within neighborhoods. Only
citizens, operating without state authority, have the ability to offer assistance when they
see a problem or promote a conciliatory service when no crime has yet been alleged.
Precisely because they do not have state authority, citizens are free to intervene on
behalf of willing parties.
Raymond Shonholtz, Community Mediation Centers: Renewing the Civic Mission for
the Twenty-First Century, 17 MEDIATION Q. 331, 335 (2000).
43 It is common to view the range of dispute resolution processes as a progression from
a consensual process that involves no third-party intervention (negotiation), through less
intrusive and still consensual forms of third-party intervention (e.g., mediation), to
adjudicative processes in which a third party can impose a binding resolution on the parties
(arbitration and trial). Trial is generally viewed as involving greater third-party control than
arbitration, as arbitration usually leaves the parties free to determine their own procedural
rules. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-5, Table 1-1 (3d ed. 1999).
44 For example, many observers (the author included) thought it unfair for Ilian
Gonzales' Miami relatives to impose a political agenda on what was essentially a private
custody matter. The legitimate concerns in L'Affaire lian involved the best interests of a
six-year-old boy, not the desire of Cuban expatriates to preserve their world view. Sheryl
McCarthy, For Elian, Nothing Can be Quite the Same Again, NEWSDAY, Jan. 31, 2000, at
A26 ("It would be a great blessing if all the adults around him would somehow calm the seas
of the political arena and concentrate on a little boy having time to just absorb the fact that he
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individual autonomy balanced by social responsibility, not a complete rejection
of the former in favor of the latter. Disputants, like anyone else, should make
choices based, at least in part, on their interests. They should recognize,
however, that their long-term interests may well be dependent on the health of
the community, that their own well-being may involve factors other than
economic self-maximization, and that it is in their interests to build social
capital, even if the immediate payback is not apparent. 45 Effective disputing
also requires a measure of engagement and interaction with others, which might
in turn promote mutual recognition of each other's interests. Self-interest is
often best served by the realization that, more often than not, disputes involve
problems to be solved rather than battles to be won.46
has a life, that he is alive.").
A sense of perspective (i.e., of seeing one's concerns in the context of the larger picture)
is important, however. As Senator John McCain has recently stated (in a different context),
"America is [now] at war, which should mean that parochial agendas are set aside for the
national goal of destroying terrorism." John McCain, Editorial, Business as Usual, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at A47.
45 See ETZIONI, SPIRIT, supra note 5, at 10. A responsibility to the environment, the
destruction of which may affect future generations far more gravely than our own, is
Etzioni's most obvious example of this imperative. Id. at 11. With respect to interpersonal
relations, Putnam quotes the contemporary philosopher Yogi Berra, who poignantly noted,
"[i]f you don't go to somebody's funeral, they won't come to yours." PUTNAM, supra note 3,
at 20.
Often the single-minded pursuit of what appears to be one's own interests (regardless of
the overall interests of the community) turns out to be counterproductive. In the post-Election
Day maneuvers following the 2000 presidential election, Vice President Gore demanded a
hand count of votes in four counties from which he hoped to gain a decisive advantage. The
United States Supreme Court halted the count. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). A
subsequent unofficial recount by a media consortium showed that the limited recount
demanded by Gore would have increased Governor Bush's margin of victory. However, a
statewide recount (avoided by Gore, due to fear that it would have increased Bush's margin
in Republican counties) apparently would have produced a Gore victory.
Governor Bush, meanwhile, opposed Gore's demands all the way to the Supreme Court;
the Court thereby halted a recount that would have confirmed Bush's victory and sent him to
the White House with a less suspect electoral mandate. As at least one commentator has
suggested, "[a]lthough neither side knew it at the time, each did its candidate more harm than
good by playing hardball." E.J. Dionne, Jr., Editorial, Lessons of the Long Recount, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at A47. Governor Bush may have also eroded his legitimacy by
rejecting Vice President Gore's pleas for a joint meeting (however self-serving); both
candidates missed an opportunity to build national consensus by ignoring intervention efforts
by former Presidents Ford and Carter.
46 Tom Arnold, 20 Common Mistakes in Mediation Advocacy, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 69, 71 (1995).
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We should be careful, however, when we speak of the "interests of the
community" with regard to disputes and disputing behavior. Repressive
authoritarianism potentially lurks behind that phrase if it is employed as an
abstraction without substance, or without inquiry as to the values being
promoted. When we talk about the interests of the community in connection
with dispute resolution, certainly we are not talking about mere institutional
convenience, e.g., the conforming of disputing behavior to a schedule arbitrarily
set by a tribunal for its own comfort. Nor should we cultivate an ethic of
ritualism, in which process is both a means and an end, and in which an illusion
of harmony is promoted through public ceremony.47 Nor, for that matter, should
we be talking about conformity for conformity's sake. While the community
should be able to enforce mores based on justice or morality, it is insufficient to
demand conformity to a rule or standard of behavior simply because "the
community" demands it.48 Simply saying that something is a community value
that should override self-interest is not a self-proving proposition; to do so
invites a form of authoritarianism that runs roughshod over legitimate individual
rights and interests. There is a repository of individual rights that require
recognition alongside community interests. Articulating the justification for
community norms, then finding the proper titration between those norms and
individual rights is the communitarian dilemma, but dispute resolution systems
can be employed to good effect here.49
47 See William, H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 91-92 (1978).
48 There is a legitimate concern, however, that as our society has become increasingly
tolerant and permissive of behavior once constrained by social mores, there is little in their
place to knit together the social fabric. See ETzioNI, GOLDEN RULE, supra note 7, at 68-70.
Many of us support the separation of church and state, and resent efforts to force either
religion or blind patriotism down peoples' throats. But in the absence of shared norms
(based, in large part, on religious and national experience), we might ask whether we are left
with no more than empty principles.
49 While in the past, legal rules might have been justified through Blackstonian
declarations of "natural law," nowadays the justification for legal rules can be found in either
pragmatic or justice-based explanations in common law decisions and statutory preambles.
Efforts to strike a balance between community norms and individual rights can be found in
cases such as Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (group prayer recited
on public address system at high school football games violates establishment clause);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause mandates exemption from
compulsory school attendance requirements); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (first amendment prohibits state-enforced flag salute).
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III. DEFINING "COMMUNITY": BUILDING AND MAINTAINING SOCIAL
CAPITAL
"He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind."
Proverbs50
We should pause here to define "community" for our purposes. Amitai
Etzioni suggests that
[c]ommunity is defined by two characteristics: first, a web of affect-laden
relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross
and reinforce one another (rather than merely one-on-one or chainlike
individual relationships), and second, a measure of commitment to a set of
shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity-in
short, to a particular culture.5 1
In analyzing disputing behavior, it might be helpful to think in terms of both
fairly small groupings in which conflict may arise, such as the workplace, a
religious group, or a professional group, and larger political or geographic
communities, such as a town, state or nation. While Etzioni's definition might
apply to both types of communities, they have different implications for
disputing behavior.
A. Building Bonding Social Capital Through Dispute Resolution
Systems
Putnam distinguishes between "bonding" (or exclusive) social capital that
looks inward and cements homogeneous groups and "bridging" (or inclusive)
social capital that is outward looking and encompasses people across diverse
social cleavages. 52 Disputing behavior involves both. Relatively small
groupings, like companies, trades, religious groups, and indigenous tribes, have
in many instances developed internal dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve
disputes in accordance with established mores and with a minimum of
disruption. These groups often, for a variety of reasons, place a premium on
harmony. Either because of their small size, their precarious economic
circumstances, or the need to maintain relationships on more than one level,
they can hardly afford friction among their members.
50 Proverbs 11:29 (King James).
51 ETzIONI, GOLDEN RULE, supra note 7, at 127.
52 PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 22.
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An example of this phenomenon exists in the diamond trade. In this
business, a relatively small, homogeneous (traditionally Jewish) group has
developed a system of arbitration and conciliation to resolve conflict in an
expeditious manner.53 This group, handling valuable goods and often doing
business on a handshake, can ill-afford major disruptions. 54 Its ability to resolve
matters internally and quickly is buttressed by a centuries-old religious tradition
as well as a pragmatic desire to contain both economic and reputational
damage.55 But while the system developed out of reputational bonds forged by a
homogeneous group, it has been preserved as the industry has become more
heterogeneous. Thus, both bonding and bridging capital have been created by
this dispute resolution system. A shift toward an information technology-based
regime seems to have played a role in maintaining reputational. bonds as
significant, even outside the homogeneous group that previously dominated the
industry. 56
Religious groups have been instrumental not only in the creation of bonding
social capital, but also in employing dispute resolution mechanisms to rebuild
that capital when the community is threatened. The disruption and betrayal of
community caused by economic or sexual scandal has been addressed through
interventions by facilitators adept at "organizational trauma recovery." 57 And in
less stressful times, the routine use of dispute resolution mechanisms established
by religious groups as diverse as Roman Catholics and Mennonites have kept
disruptions within communities to little more than a simmer. 58 A similar
53 While the diamond bourses have established an arbitration system that has supplanted
state-created substantive and procedural law, eighty to eighty-five percent of the disputes
submitted to arbitration are settled during the procedure's conciliation phase. Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 153 (1992).
54 1d. at 135-37.
55 See id. at 148. Professor Bernstein provides economic as well as social reasons for the
efficiency of this system. Id. at 135-43. But it should not be a source of dismay that
reputational bonds created by good business ethics have a salutary economic impact.
56 Id. at 143-45. To the extent this remains true, it may address Putnam's call for new
systems of building social capital. PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 22-24; 170-80.
57 See, e.g., David Brubaker, Organizational Trauma Recovery: The "God's Fellowship
Community Church "Reconciliation Process, in THE CoNsENsus BUILDING HANDBOOK 1051
(Lawrence Susskind et al., eds., 1999).
58 Disputes in colonial Puritan communities were often handled through a multistage
process of informal resolution. Typically, the disputing parties would first decide on one or
more arbitrators to resolve the dispute. If arbitration failed, elders and others in the
community spoke with the disputants in an effort to achieve a solution and restore communal
harmony. When all else failed, a proceeding was held before the minister and congregation.
The proceeding bore no resemblance to our 21st century conception of due process.
Ministers often acted as both judge and prosecutor, lawyers were not involved, the
congregation was free to speak at will of facts, opinions, or admonitions and there were no
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mechanism is seen in the sentencing circle employed by many Native American
tribes to deal with antisocial behavior. The very physical device of a circle
emphasizes the interest of the community in treating an offender so as not only
to deal with the offense at hand, but to draw the miscreant back into the
community in a healing manner. 59
The Native American sentencing circle may be seen as an example of what
Professor William Ury describes as the "third side." The third side involves "the
vigilant, active, and constructive involvement of the surrounding members of
the community" in the management of conflict.60 The surrounding community
serves as a container for conflict, and "as a kind of social immune system
preventing the spread of the virus of violence." 61 The third side may be served
through a number of roles and may find a variety of "voices": teachers, bridge
builders, mediators, arbiters, witnesses and peacekeepers are some of the
examples Ury furnishes. 62 What is common to successful systems, formal and
appeals. While the church could not incarcerate or seize property, admonition and
excommunication from the community were common penalties. AUERBACH, supra note 40,
at 23-25.
Quakers, like the Puritans, had an elaborate system of dispute resolution. Known as the
"gospel order," the process first required the disputing parties to work out their differences in
a brotherly fashion. If this failed, one or two "discreet, judicious friends" would encourage
acceptance of arbitration by disinterested Quakers. If the preliminary arbitration failed,
aribitrators referred the disputants to the "monthly meeting" where arbitrators were appointed
and the parties had to accept their ruling under pain of disownment by their fellow Quakers.
Id. at 29-31.
The Mennonite church also has a tradition of internal dispute resolution through
mediation. For an in depth discussion of the Mennonite Conciliation Service, founded in
1979, see John Paul Lederach & Ron Kraybill, The Paradox of Popular Justice: A
Practitioner's View, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds.,
1993).
The Bet Din (Hebrew for "house ofjustice") is a form of alternative dispute resolution
dating back thousands of years ago and is used around the world by the Jewish community.
For a thorough description and several case studies, see Randy Linda Sturman, House of
Judgment: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W.
L. REV. 417 (2000); see generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For
Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665-68 (1985).
In some instances, mechanisms adopted by religious communities may be regarded as
repressive and exclusionary. See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105
(Pa. 1975) (involving Mennonite practice of "shunning").
59 Ulrich, supra note 16, at 432-34; 438-40.
6 0 WILLIAM URY, THE THIRD SIDE: WHY WE FIGHT AND How WE CAN STOP 5 (1999).
61 Id. at 7.
62 Id. at 190-96.
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informal, is their effectiveness in containing disputes and, using community
resources to resolve them in a peaceful fashion. As a prominent example of the
third side, Ury describes the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert who, in the
absence of formal leaders or centralized government, "do a good job of
controlling harmful conflict" by engaging in prolonged discussion of problems
and arriving at consensus as to their resolution. 63
In America, where disputes often involve heterogeneous groups, the
containment of conflict within a community is more likely to involve formal
processes. For example, businesses and their unionized employees have
developed a system of arbitration to resolve workplace disputes arising under
collective bargaining agreements.' Here, the disputants are less homogeneous
than in the foregoing examples: while labor and management have a common
interest in keeping the enterprise in operation, the parties to a workplace dispute
are more likely to be culturally and economically diverse. Yet a "law of the
shop" prevails as to both substance and procedure, drawn from a common
economic endeavor and a culture developed though two generations of disputing
under the National Labor Relations Act.64 The availability of efficient and
accessible grievance procedures obtained through collective bargaining and
union representation promotes individual autonomy (without this procedure,
few workers would have their grievances heard, and life in the workplace would
be nasty, brutish and short) while maintaining peace in the workplace. 65
6 3 1d. at 4-5.
64 The decline in the proportion of the American workforce belonging to unions and
covered by collective bargaining agreements has resulted in a decline in social capital. See,
e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 80-82. Putnam points out the role of labor organizations as
"an important locus of social solidarity, a mechanism for mutual assistance and shared
expertise." Id. at 80. Labor economist Peter Pestillo has lamented, "[w]e are experiencing the
cult of the individual, and labor is taking a beating preaching the comfort of coalition." Peter
J. Pestillo, Can Unions Meet the Needs of a 'New' Work Force?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb.
1979, at 33 (1979) (quoted in PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 82). But the failure to engage in
collective action has resulted in a decline in worker autonomy, as non-unionized workers
become increasingly subject to the whims of employers and managers. The failure to make
short-term sacrifices in recognition of a common interest-i.e., the insistence not only on
bowling alone, but bargaining alone-has unfortunately resulted in less autonomy for the
individual worker.
65 This system has its limitations. Mediation of collective bargaining agreements (under
which grievances are arbitrated) typically occurs through "shuttle diplomacy," a series of
private caucuses with the mediator in which the two sides (labor and management) are rarely
in the same room. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 13, at 810 (describing "shuttle
diplomacy" mediation). An agreement usually emerges, but without the face-to-face
engagement that may be preferable where an ongoing working relationship is at stake.
Perhaps the formal arbitration process-in which a third party ultimately imposes a decision
on the parties-would be resorted to less frequently if the parties were more engaged with
one another during the collective bargaining process that brought about the agreement in the
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Why do systems like this work? Putnam writes:
An effective norm of generalized reciprocity is bolstered by dense networks of
social exchange. If two would-be collaborators are members of a tightly knit
community, they are likely to encounter one another in the future--or to hear
about one another through the grapevine. Thus they have reputations at stake
that are almost surely worth more than gains from momentary treachery. 66
Why are good internal dispute resolution systems important? Not only does
an effective internal dispute resolution system expeditiously resolve the dispute
at hand, it mitigates fallout and helps prevent or alleviate the consequences of
future disputes. At times of crisis (such as that faced by the nation following the
September 11 attacks), communities evidencing strong bonding social capital
are quickest to mobilize and deal effectively with external threats.67
Organizations or micro-communities that maintain their bonding social capital
through healthy conflict resolution processes (as distinguished from repression
or coercion) are healthier and more confident, and therefore more able to deal
with conflict with the outside world in a constructive manner. 68 In short, in
ways seen and unseen, effective internal dispute resolution systems help build
social capital conducive to the effective functioning of the community at large
(or macro-community), as well as the micro-community.
first place. The system is, nevertheless, a substantial improvement on the violence and
repression that preceded it.
66 PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 136.
67 The laudable conduct of New York City's Police and Fire Departments in the
immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks is a prominent example. These departments
evidenced tight fraternal bonds long before the attacks galvanized them to heroic action.
Note, however, that these departments had been heavily criticized prior to September 11 for
racially biased attitudes and practices. See Ron Howell, Fire in the Blood: Vulcan Leader
who Follows in Family Footsteps Speaks Out, NEWSDAY, May 6, 2001, at 7 (discussing
hiring practices of New York City Fire Department); Report Urges Retraining Cops; Diallo
Panel Says Rules Not Violated, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, Apr. 27, 2001, at A19;
Barbara Mikkelson, Statue of Liberties, at http://www.snopes2.com/rumors/memorial.htm
(last modified Jan. 18, 2001) (discussing controversy regarding a memorial to New York
City firefighters and noting that fewer than six percent of New York firefighters were
African-American or Hispanic).
68 We might compare instances in which bonding social capital has been maintained
through repression, as in Nazi Germany and Taliban-ruled Afganistan, and the destructive
manner in which these entities have dealt with the outside world.
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B. The Need for Bridging Social Capital
Yet the ability of homogeneous groups to build bonding capital or even the
ability of more heterogeneous groups (like labor and management) to build
bridging capital through internal dispute resolution procedures only begins to
measure the value of dispute resolution processes in the search for community.
We can speak of the "Amish community" or the "legal community" or the
"African-American community," or even the "Rotisserie Baseball League
community," and each would have meaning, particularly to their respective
members. Conflict may develop within these communities, and bonding capital
may be produced as their members employ mechanisms developed by their
respective communities to resolve this conflict with a minimum of disruption.
But the true test of conflict resolution mechanisms in a heterogeneous society
involves disputes among people of different backgrounds and interests, whose
shared experiences are not as deep and among whom there is likely to be less
trust.
Communitarian Charles Taylor goes so far as to disparage "partial
groupings" like ethnic minorities, adherents of particular religions and special
interests. These "local" groups can fragment citizens' allegiance to the larger
community. 69 Indeed, there is a dark side to narrow community identification,
which can result in exclusion and anti-social behavior. Both the Ku Klux Klan
and the Cosa Nostra70 are examples of narrow groups adopting their own
standards of behavior to the detriment of the community at large. Putnam, while
acknowledging the value of bonding social capital, also recognizes that it may
create "strong out-group antagonism." 71 Indeed, invidious narrow groups such
as the Klan and the Cosa Nostra have fostered unflattering and inaccurate
stereotypes of certain regional or ethnic groups, such as Southerners or Italian-
Americans.
But groups of people sharing a common background or interest can also
enhance the larger community through constructive disputing behavior. A
remarkable example is seen in the strategy of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in pursuing school integration in the
1950s and 1960s. That a historically excluded group, like African-Americans,
would avail itself of the nation's legal apparatus, as it did in Brown v. Board of
Education72 and similar cases, to attack an entrenched, officially endorsed
69 BRUCE FROHNEN, THE NEW COMMUNITARIANS AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 51 (1996).
70 Literally, "our thing."
71 PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 360-61.
72 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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system of segregation, is an affirmation of community in its finest sense. 73 In
Brown and subsequent cases, an oppressed minority group, members of which
were victims of decades of legally sanctioned discrimination, accessed the larger
community's legal mechanisms to obtain inclusion, rather than breaking off and
wallowing in self-pity and segregation (or, for that matter, engaging in
violence). 74 In so doing, the NAACP and its allies in the African-American
community strengthened the African-American community while enhancing the
community at large. 75
Community-based mediation programs employ elements of both bonding
and bridging social capital: bonding capital because they typically are based in
small geographic units; bridging capital because many of the communities they
serve are economically, ethnically and culturally diverse. A communitarian
ethos underlies much of the work of these programs. "A community's ability to
reduce or prevent conflict and manage it reflects social cohesion and pervasive
normative values. Concomitantly, the building of prevention mechanisms and
skills within a community strengthens civic roots and promotes social
73 In a 1958 interview, the African-American writer Ralph Ellison commented:
[I]n the United States, the values of my own people are neither "white" nor "black";
they are American. Nor can I see how they could be anything else, since we are a people
who are involved in the texture of the American experience. And indeed, today the most
dramatic fight for American ideals is being sparked by black Americans. Significantly,
we are the only black peoples who are not fighting for separation from the "whites," but
for a fuller participation in the society which we share with "whites." And it is of further
significance that we pursue our goals precisely in terms of American constitutionalism.
If there is anything in this which points to "black values" it must lie in the circumstance
that we really believe that all men are created equal and that they should be given a
chance to achieve their highest potentialities, regardless of race, creed, color or past
condition of servitude.
Ralph Ellison, Some Questions and Some Answers, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH
ELLISON 291, 299 (John F. Callahan ed., 1995).
74 See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 214-24 (discussing the development of the NAACP's legal
program); see generally Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters. Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing litigation
strategies of the NAACP under Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg).
75 There are those who will debate whether the legal battle to end public school
segregation-with the ensuing white flight from the inner cities, the growth in residential
segregation, and the decline of many urban and rural school districts-has strengthened
either the African-American community or the nation as a whole. See PUTNAM, supra note 3,
at 311-13. But I cannot conceive of an America in which legally enforced segregation in
public institutions remained the norm. The end to officially sponsored apartheid was integral
to the survival of the American community. I would further argue that the demise of
segregation in private life is yet another necessary ingredient for national survival.
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cohesion." 76 Community therefore becomes both a means of resolving conflict
and an end of the conflict resolution process. While outside assistance-in the
form of training, funding, and organizational expertise-may help establish and
maintain these programs, their vitality ultimately depends on the ongoing
participation and engagement of community members who recognize the need
to build and maintain social capital.
Of course, some people will not see the need to build the larger community.
Some members of smaller groups, rebuffed and marginalized by the larger
community, will see fit to carve out a separate path.77 Even among those who
have not been marginalized, the myth of the rugged individualist is deeply
ingrained in the American psyche, and no amount of exposure to the novels of
Wallace Stegner or the movies of Frank Capra will disabuse some people of the
notion that they can go it alone. Some see isolating themselves from the larger
world as a way of asserting their imagined superiority. Still others, withdrawing
to their gated subdivisions, will regard their isolation as an act of self-defense.
But inevitably, the complexities of modem society will draw all but the most
ardent survivalist into interaction with others. And conflict will inevitably arise
out of this interaction. We may pick our spots (after all, some petty annoyances
are better off left ignored), but at some juncture, engagement is preferable to
avoidance. 78
76 Shonholtz, supra note 42, at 334.
77 Examples can be found in the black separatist movement, most notably Marcus
Garvey's "Back to Africa" movement and the Nation of Islam.
78 Individual psychology undoubtedly influences attitudes regarding conflict. Mnookin,
Peppet and Tulumello, along with Thomas and Kilmann, have categorized conflict behavior
in terms of the amount of empathy and assertiveness exhibited by an individual. Robert H.
Mnookin et al., The Tension Between Empathy andAssertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217,219-21
(1996); Ralph H. Kilmann & Kenneth W. Thomas, Interpersonal Conflict-Handling
Behavior as Reflections ofJungian Personality Dimensions, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 971 (1975).
A person with low empathy and low assertiveness is likely to avoid conflict; one with a high
level of assertiveness and low empathy will compete; one with high empathy but low
assertiveness will accommodate; one who exhibits both qualities in moderation will
compromise. Perhaps the most desirable disputing behavior is evidenced by those with high
levels of empathy and assertiveness; ideally, those individuals engage in collaboration so as
to maximize gains for all. See Mnookin et al., supra, at 223-26.
I suspect that most disputants are not entirely frozen in their attitudes toward conflict.
The levels of empathy and assertiveness (and therefore the responses to conflict) might vary
with the nature of the dispute, the issues (legal and non-legal) involved, and the disputants'
perceptions of each other. They might also vary with the extent to which legal counsel (who
might be seen as disputants' coaches in disputing behavior) promote empathy and
assertiveness. Historically, the conduct of lawyers seems to suggest more of the latter than
the former; I would suggest that the cultivation of a client's empathy is at least as legitimate a
role for a lawyer as the promotion of assertiveness. See infra notes 185-206 and
accompanying text.
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IV. PROCESS CHOICES
"Not to decide is to decide."
- Harvey Cox79
All dispute resolution processes have elements conducive to
communitarianism, yet all such choices can be employed in a manner
detrimental to the building of community. Those seeking out communitarian
ends should therefore be conscious not only about which process is used, but the
manner in which it is employed. Our discussion here will consider the
communitarian implications of three primary processes: traditional courtroom
litigation, arbitration, and mediation. 80
A. Litigation: Collaboration in the Midst of Contention
Legal structures can provide a framework for discourse necessary to
community, but they can also erect barriers to constructive human interaction.
In his fine little book, Community and the Politics of Place,81 Professor Daniel
Kemmis describes the philosophy underlying the Federalist approach to the
United States Constitution. Meeting in the aftermath of Shays' Rebellion (a
revolt of farmers in western Massachusetts) and worrying about a reprise of this
event, James Madison and the other Federalist framers developed "a machinery
of government which would pump out solutions without requiring ... direct
citizen engagement. '82 The constitutional system of checks and balances, in
which one branch of government would serve a blocking function as to the
urges of another, was, in Kemmis's view, at variance with Thomas Jefferson's
notion of a "Republican tradition" based on a "face-to-face, hands-on approach
7 9 Harvey Cox, in LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 297
(1977).
80 Dispute resolution scholars distinguish between the primary processes of negotiation,
mediation, arbitration and courtroom litigation and hybrid processes such as med-arb, fact-
finding, summary jury trial, mini-trial, and private judging. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 4-5. Because the secondary processes incorporate elements of the primary
processes, our focus is on the three primary processes in which neutrals are employed.
81 DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND ThE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990).
82 Id. at 11. Kemmis suggests that the framers were attempting to avoid insurrections
like Shays' Rebellion. Id. Communitarian Mary Ann Glendon has suggested that the framers
attempted to devise a machinery through which checks and balances would block legislative
efforts to dilute property rights. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5, at 24-25. This
constitutional protection of "absolutes" in the form of private property rights may have had
the substantive effect of erosion of broader community interests. Id. at 41-46.
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to problem solving, with its implicit belief that people could rise above their
particular interests to pursue a common good."'83 Kemmis's book goes on to
describe several instances in which the blocking function performed by
constitutional government at all levels has frustrated citizens' efforts to improve
their communities. 84 He also describes a limited number of instances in which
citizens have risen above the constraints of constitutional government to engage
in collaborative processes to build better solutions for their communities. 85
Kemmis's conception of the Madisonian construct and the Jeffersonian
ideal finds a parallel in dispute resolution processes. Much as the Constitution
was developed as an antidote to the disorder of Shays' Rebellion and similar
83 KEMMIS, supra note 81, at 11. Jefferson in fact saw the need for a check on
government excess, but he envisioned that this would occur through the popular will,
possibly through periodic constitutional conventions. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Query XII: The
Constitution of the State, and its Several Charters?, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
(1787), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffvir.htm (last visitied Aug. 13,
2002).
84 KEMMIS, supra note 81, at 39, 60 (discussing debates of citizens of Northern Rockies
states and the federal government over environmental, recreational, agricultural, and mining
issues). These "standoff struggle[s] ... [have] sapped the energy and resources of all
concerned." Id. at 39. An extreme example of this struggle is the cancellation of a public
hearing proposed to gather opinions on the Bridger-Teton National Forest draft plan. The
hearing was cancelled due to security concerns: Louisiana-Pacific employees planned to
bring in comments written on two-by-fours. Id. at 60; see also id. at 46 (The author also
describes a maneuver by John Seiberling, Idaho legislator and chair of a House subcommittee
on wilderness, to block passage of a wilderness bill. He submitted an aggressive wilderness
bill "too large for Idaho Senator James McClure to swallow." The maneuver blocked the
passage of anything.); see also id. at 58-59 (noting how an anticipated "trace race,"
involving mountain bikes, kayaks, and hang gliders, to take place during a planned summer
festival in a small town in Montana was cancelled when the possibility of a lawsuit was
raised).
85 Id. at 92-94 (This is an example of voters using the power of the vote unselfishly; a
ballot referendum was held regarding regulation of the dairy industry by the Milk Control
Board. Even though the voters could vote to lower the milk price, the voters chose not to
lower the price because of the adverse effect on many "mom and pop" businesses.); See also
id. at 111-13 (This exemplifies choosing mediation over a public hearing: a community
organization requested a grant from the city council for a community solar greenhouse,
which would be attached to a laundromat to provide the necessary heat and operating funds.
Other laundromat owners are opposed because of the diversion of business from their
laundromats to the new laundromat. The parties agree to mediation, which settles the dispute
without leaving either side bitter or unwilling to trust each other in the future.); id. at 114
(Here parties are agreeing to discuss a dispute without a mediator: a paper mill requests
permission to dump into a river; a newly formed environmental group is opposed. The parties
agree to meet, and, remarkably, jointly present a plan to the administrative agency. By
recognizing their ability to be the decision makers, the groups formed a sense of trust and
reliability.).
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disruptions, our system of litigation developed as an alternative to the blood
feud and other chaotic devices, deemed intolerable in a civilized society.
Litigation averts the direct physical clash of adversaries by channeling
disputants into a stylized process that removes the battle from the principals and
into an arena of abstraction, in which the chief combatants are attorneys.
Disputes are resolved through the application of abstract principles of law to the
facts at hand, not through a reconciliation of the disputants' interests.
Jeffersonian engagement is averted through the employment of Madisonian
machinery in which roles are assigned, discourse is channeled, and a result-
deemed acceptable more due to conformity to process than to substantive
satisfaction-eventually emerges.
1. Litigation as Affirmation of Community
Professor Etzioni has observed that "societies are continuously subject to
centrifugal forces that exacerbate the need to maintain order . . . and to
centripetal forces that increase the need to protect autonomy. ' 86 In the context
of conflict resolution, litigation is characteristically viewed (especially by
communitarians) as a centrifugal force through which individuals move heaven
and earth to assert their rights and vindicate their egos. 87 But litigation may be
viewed as a centripetal force in at least two respects. First, resort to litigation
for the assertion of individual rights (to claim, in effect, what is rightfully one's
own) involves an affirmation of community, a willingness to have the
community's standards (as reflected by its laws) applied to one's dispute,
through the procedures adopted and the judges appointed by the community. 88
"Trust that the sovereign's interests are in harmony with one's own is the basis
of all government," says Bruce Frohnen. "We require government only because
we tend to favor our own cause too much when we are involved in any
altercation." 89 Second, when we elect litigation, we cede a degree of our
86 ETZIONI, GOLDEN RULE, supra note 7, at 46.
87 See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5, at 173-75.
88 The writer Ralph Ellison saw the same contradiction in jazz:
There is... a cruel contradiction implicit in the art form itself, for true jazz is an art of
individual assertion within and against the group. Each true jazz moment (as distinct
from the uninspired commercial performance) springs from a contest in which each
artist challenges all the rest; each solo flight, or improvisation, represents (like the
successive canvasses of a painter) a definition of his identity as individual, as member
of the collectivity and as a link in the chain of tradition.
Ralph Ellison, The Charlie Christian Story, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON
266, 267 (John F. Callahan ed., 1995).
89 FROHNEN, supra note 69, at 32. Kemmis suggests a less inspiring view of this
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autonomy in the interest of community cohesion, whether due to recognition
that the peace of the community must be respected (and that we can no longer
resort to the blood feud) or due to enlightened self-interest, realizing that resort
to the courts is likely to be more effective than self-help. In effect, we throw
ourselves at the mercy of our peers, trusting in the community's judgment,
through its legal standards and our fellow citizens employed to enforce them.90
Litigation provides each citizen the opportunity to pursue justice before one
or more neutral decisionmakers, with procedural protections designed
principally to insure fairness. 91 When carried to the extreme, however, litigation
can serve as the ultimate manifestation of a self-absorbed preoccupation with
individual rights to the derogation of community interests and needs, or what
Professor Mary Ann Glendon calls an overemphasis on "rights talk."'92 "Our
rights talk," says Glendon, "in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead
toward consensus, accommodation, or at least discovery of common ground. 93
The very seating arrangement of the American courtroom-with the litigants
and their counsel facing the bench, not each other-illustrates the type of
discourse to be expected: detached, formal, and stylized-not direct, casual or
mechanism, in which the very process of public decision making and the procedure of
zealously advocating one's cause to a neutral third party produce a situation where all parties
end up frustrating and blocking each other so that no party ultimately benefits. KEMMIS,
supra note 81, at 53. "Public decision makers are... constitutionally encumbered by the
responsibility to hear. But the duty to hear does not extend beyond the decision maker: those
who testify are not encumbered by any such responsibility. Their role, in our system, is to
make the strongest possible case for their particular interests." Id.
90 The use of the jury, rather than an elite group of professional decision-makers, to
make critical determinations may also be viewed as an expression of faith in the community.
A contrast is provided by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century preference of elites for
dueling "because it avoided using social inferiors sitting in judgment." Douglas H. Yam, The
Attorney as Duelist's Friend: Lessons from the Code Duello, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 69,
84 (2000). Perhaps the private trial-in which parties avoid the public court system by
purchasing private adjudication services-is the modem counterpart to that phenomenon.
91 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to "be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
92 GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 5, at 14.
93 Id. William H. Simon, describing the Positivist model of advocacy, describes this
phenomenon as follows:
The rules will describe for each citizen a private sphere of autonomy. Within this
sphere, he need not account to anyone for his actions. So long as he remains within his
sphere, he need not fear coercion by the sovereign. The sovereign's enforcement of the
rules against the other citizens will insure that they do not trespass within his sphere.
Simon, supra note 47, at 40.
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colloquial.94 The formality of the system maintains decorum and channels the
discussion into that which is deemed, legally relevant and admissible, and is
designed to minimize engagement between the parties. Thus, while serving as a
mechanism for the pacific resolution of disputes, litigation can be a device that
separates disputants from one another (again, note the Madisonian construct),
rather than bringing them together (the Jeffersonian ideal). 95
Nevertheless, much as the Constitution serves as a legal framework on
which collaborative processes can be built, the litigation machinery serves as the
engine that allows more collaborative dispute resolution processes to move
forward. Historian Garry Wills has suggested that for Madison, the Constitution
was only the starting point for later collective discussion and compromise. 96 In
like manner, the litigation process may serve as a starting point for constructive
discussion and growth through collaborative processes such as negotiation and
mediation. Without the ultimate recourse to the litigation machinery, many
parties would be unwilling to explore more collaborative forms of dispute
resolution. 97 It is, for better or worse, the availability of a leviathan that can
force reluctant parties into the courtroom, make a decision and then make it
stick (through judicial enforcement mechanisms) that forces parties to consider
other process choices that may be more suitable to the occasion. Some forced
unions ripen into happy marriages.98
94 Likewise, the etiquette of the courtroom, in which attorneys address the bench, the
witness, or the jury - but not each other - reinforces the idea of a forum in which the clash of
principles is played out in steps to be measured by a third party, not dealt with through direct
discourse and accommodation among adversaries. If the give-and-take of mediation and
other consensual processes resemble improvisational jazz, then courtroom litigation
resembles, at its best, a classical minuet.
951 must admit to some reluctance to label the idea of engagement "Jeffersonian," given
Jefferson's avowed distrust of cities and espousal of agrarian society. Bellah et al., supra note
5, at 30. Then again, the man seemed to enjoy his time in Paris. See Library of Congr.,
Thomas Jefferson: Genius of Liberty 40-50 (2000).
96 FROHNEN, supra note 69, at 88-93.
97 Describing the success of mediation of special education and landlord-tenant
disputes, Judge Harry Edwards has noted, "[Iun both of these examples however, the option
of ultimate resort to adjudication is essential. It is only because handicapped children have a
statutory right to education that parent-school mediation is successful. It is only because
tenants have procedural rights that landlords will bargain at all." Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 682 (1986).
98 Sometimes, however, the procedural mechanisms of litigation can be manipulated to
alter and even warp a negotiated result. Defendants sometimes settle weak claims for
"nuisance value" simply to rid themselves of the expenses of litigation; plaintiffs settle at an
amount substantially discounted from the anticipated value of their claims (even taking the
possibility of an adverse judgment into account) because they cannot afford the risk or delay
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2. The Therapeutic Value of Litigation
Employed properly, litigation can have a therapeutic effect on the
community. 99 Some litigation, like the landmark Brown v. Board of
Education100 case, can alter the community's rules, standards and mores for the
better. 101 Most cases have neither the importance nor the wide-ranging effect of
Brown, but retain great meaning and prominence in the lives of those most
directly involved. In such cases, recourse to a neutral who will ultimately render
an enforceable, final decision can have a cathartic effect on the parties, even the
losing parties. 10 2 Even where the results are disappointing or seemingly
irrational, litigation is what we might call "process protected"; that is, losing
participants can be reconciled to the result so long as they have had an
opportunity to be heard and the appropriate or "due" process has been
followed. 10 3
that is the luxury of a repeat player such as an insurance company. Often, settlements "are
determined by formulae or 'rules of thumb,"' with little or no participation by disputants in
the process. See Hensler, supra note 25, at 166. Disputes involving one-time encounters (and
minimal investment in social capital), rather than ongoing relationships, are most prone to
this distortion.
99 There are those who belittle the importance of this effect. See, e.g., Mark Lenz, Bin
Laden and the Courts (Letter to the Editor), NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 2001, at 14 ("Lawsuits
aren't therapy, though, or shouldn't be. To value them that way distorts both the suits and the
system.").
100 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101 In an article otherwise notable for its misunderstanding of consensual dispute
resolution processes, Professor Owen Fiss quite properly observed:
To conceive of the civil lawsuit in public terms as America does might be unique. I am
willing to assume that no other country... has a case like Brown v. Board ofEducation
in which the judicial power is used to eradicate the caste structure. I am willing to
assume that no other country conceives of law and uses law in quite the way we do. But
this should be a source of pride rather than shame.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
102 When I served on an administrative appeals panel, I wrote my opinions primarily for
the benefit of the losing party. Most judges with whom I have discussed this approach have
agreed: justice requires that the losing party is entitled, in the very least, to an explanation as
to why she has come out on the short end.
103 Popular frustration with the litigation process is often a consequence of situations in
which rules of evidence or procedural niceties are allowed to obscure the underlying issues;
i.e., where the parties have been denied the opportunity to give "voice" to their problems.
William Simon, in the context of a critique of Positivism, has described the problem as
follows:
The establishment of this second [procedural] body of rules has a curious consequence.
The substantive rules reflect the basic purpose of the system, the securing of order in the
social world. The procedural rules are designed to deal with a technical problem. Once
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To be sure, communities, large and small, can be drained by litigation. Few
institutions emerge unscathed from an internal power struggle that is fully
processed by the courts, and communities that have been the focus of major
school busing disputes or adjudicated zoning battles often require years to mend
their wounds. But the devices supplanted by litigation-the blood feud, street
clashes, and mob rule-were far more draining and disruptive to community.
That is why medieval rulers insisted on some kind of trial system in lieu of the
blood feud. Resort to the courts, as grueling and disruptive as it may be, is an
affirmation of the community's rules, mores, and its very legitimacy. The
American system of litigation had its antecedent in the efforts of early Norman
kings to legitimize their rule through the establishment of courts with the
ultimate power to adjudicate disputes throughout England, and thereby establish
a common law for the entire realm) 0 4 The system thereby fashioned, and of
which we are the beneficiaries today, produces a stylized joust, 10 5 in which
established rules of procedure govern but in which (we are told) substance
ultimately matters. 10 6 That this system is often mimicked in private processes
the system is set into motion, however, the procedural rules play the more fundamental
role. Order depends on the citizens' compliance with the substantive rules, and
compliance depends on the application of sanctions by the sovereign. The application of
sanctions is governed by procedural rules. The key to the system is the operation of the
sovereign, and the ultimate test of the legitimacy of any of the sovereign's acts is
procedural. For the citizen, this means that compliance with the substantive law does not
guarantee immunity from state sanctions. Nor does liability necessarily follow from
violations of the substantive rules. The procedural rules legitimate results which may be
substantively wrong. Having repudiated personal notions of justice at the outset of its
system, Positivism ends by refusing to guarantee the citizen even the legal justice
defined by the substantive law. All the citizen can count on is a day in court.
Simon, supra note 47, at 43-44.
104 REMBAR, supra note 42, at 26. Rembar's book describing the development of the
American system of justice is written primarily for a lay readership, which is altogether
appropriate: acceptance of community norms for disputing must come from the public at
large, not just the legal community.
105 Some commentators are (with some justification) critical of the artificial nature of
the roles lawyers are forced to play in this system. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra
note 27; Simon, supra note 47. But there is a societal benefit to forcing people to behave in a
civilized manner while confronting one another regarding serious and presumably heartfelt
differences.
106 For a more cynical view of the role of substance and procedure in litigation, see
generally GLENDON, NATION, supra note 35, and in particular her observation, "Though
lawyers did not invent procedure, they have become its high priests and protectors." Id. at
105. See also Simon, supra note 47, at 44 (suggesting that procedure has come to eclipse
substance in litigation).
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employed by trade groups and religious groups 107 and even by for-profit
organizations selling privatized adjudication services108 may be seen not as a
rejection of the adjudicative process, but rather as a tribute to its resiliency. 109
3. The Need for Cooperation in Litigation
Of course resort to the courts does not grant license for mayhem. To the
contrary, courts and the attendant rules of procedure and professional conduct
were established as centripetal forces to keep matters in orbit, lest they fly off
into space. Litigation may be combat, but it is orderly combat, involving rules
of engagement. These rules require a degree of collaboration, even among
adversaries. 110 Lawyers possess a special privilege to represent others in
litigation because they are presumed to be knowledgeable about the rules of
engagement and are removed from the fray, and thereby deemed more capable
than their clients of engaging in the type of collaboration necessary for the
process to go forward.'I 1 This collaboration ideally involves two or more
107 See generally supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
108 E.g., the American Arbitration Association, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution,
and JAMS/Endispute (private organizations offering adjudication services). LEONARD L.
RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 504 (2d ed. 1997).
109 The desire for an authoritative neutral decision-maker is illustrated by a trivial
incident in which I was involved in college. Three of us, officers of our student-run college
radio station, were taking a break in the snack bar when I accidentally spilled a milkshake on
another officer's lap. We both immediately turned to the station manager (who out-ranked
both of us in the station's hierarchy) to determine responsibility for the cleaning bill. He
correctly noted what my subsequently acquired lawyer's vocabulary would describe as a lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
10 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (providing for broad-ranging discovery), especially
subdivision (a) (requiring certain disclosures without a written discovery request) and
subdivision (e) (requiring supplementation of disclosures and responses); FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(2)(B) (requiring that parties confer or attempt to confer to secure discovery without
court action); FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (providing for pre-trial conferences). Many local rules of
court require cooperation among counsel, e.g., U.S. DIST CT. FOR M. D. OF PA. R. OF CT.,
R. 16.3(a) (requiring attorneys to file joint case management statement); R. 16.3(b) (requiring
attorneys to confer for purpose of entering into agreements regarding subjects referred to in
FED. R. Civ. P. 16).
111 Judge Alvin Rubin has observed:
The monopoly on the practice of law does not arise from the presumed advantages of an
attorney's education or social status: it stems from the concept that, as professionals,
lawyers serve society's interests by participating in the process of achieving the just
termination of disputes. That an adversary system is the basic means to this end does
not crown it with supreme value. It is means, not end.
Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 557, 589
(1975).
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members of the bar who have received similar schooling in the mores of the
profession and continue to be immersed in bar-related activities. Brother and
sister lawyers, though adversaries in litigation, speak a common language,
follow a common set of rules (as to both procedure and professional conduct),
attend the same meetings, dine at the same table. The bonding social capital
thereby generated enables them to jointly encounter and resolve the many small
difficulties encountered in the course of litigation: the scheduling of depositions,
the exchange of documents, the justified extensions of time, the obstructions
posed by archaic or bureaucratic court procedures. Cooperation regarding the
"little things" not only makes life a little more pleasant, it creates strands of
social capital that enable attorneys to explore potential agreement regarding the
"big things": i.e., the underlying dispute. Effective attorneys thereby use the
bonding social capital of the profession to build bridging social capital between
their clients. 12
In the absence of this cooperation,litigation would be a small hell. Alas, it
sometimes is. All too often, litigator conduct more closely resembles armed
combat than civilized discourse. 113 Excessive gamesmanship and incivility can
turn an otherwise genteel process into a caricature that loses sight of the
substantive legal principles designed to advance underlying societal values."14
Ironically, lawyers often experience the greatest tension and animosity in their
practice not when they are called upon to argue matters of substance before an
impartial referee, but when they are required to collaborate with one another
without supervision regarding seemingly trivial procedural matters: the
scheduling of depositions, the exchange of documents, the array of nagging
112 Empirical studies have indicated a predominance of lawyers perceived to be
"cooperative," along with the perception that cooperative lawyers are more effective
negotiators than "competitive" lawyers. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT 48-52 (1983).
113 More collaborative dispute resolution processes can fall prey to similar problems:
parties may lie or behave abusively during negotiation; advocates may try to manipulate a
mediator; disputants may try any number of ploys to obtain an edge, rather than a mutually
satisfying result. See, e.g., Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for
Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 259, 259-63 (1973).
114 Professor Glendon comments,
Now that lawyers are beginning to say that they want to run their 'business as a
business,' many seem to suppose that they are exempt from ordinary decent
behavior .... What seems to have gotten lost somewhere is Lincoln's down-to-earth,
unpretentious attitude toward decency in business, rooted in the ... understanding that
any business, including law, thrives best on cooperation and honesty.
GLENDON, NATION, supra note 35, at 82.
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details that are necessary components of a case or transaction.11 5 Trained to
represent the client zealously, lawyers (especially young lawyers) forget the
constraints that make the practice of law possible, and assume that they should
be combative all the time. Unsupervised lawyers often behave like
schoolchildren when the teacher is not watching, rather than like mature tennis
players "calling their own."' 16 To those who regard character as "what you do
when nobody else is watching," 17 the decline in lawyer behavior outside the
direct scrutiny of the courts should be of particular concern. After all, it is our
unsupervised behavior that is the best test of our ethics, communitarian or
otherwise.
It is unnecessary to catalogue the myriad complaints, significant and petty,
regarding lawyers' disputing behavior. What is disturbing from a
communitarian standpoint is the all-too-frequent failure of lawyers to
demonstrate how to disagree without being disagreeable-and thereby preserve
community despite the existence of conflict.118 Why does this occur? I think
there are at least two dynamics at work:
First: When disputants employ an adjudicative model of conflict resolution,
they forfeit their autonomy with respect to the ultimate decision-making. A
device chosen to assert one's ego (as communitarians critical of litigation might
describe it) ironically requires loss of control to others: lawyers who put the
device in motion, judges and juries who make the ultimate decisions. The
frustration stemming from loss of control often leads disputants to try to rig the
115 John J. Curtin, Jr., Litigation and Litigators: Where Are We Headed?, LITIG., Fall
1998, at 49-50.
116 Tennis star John McEnroe, known for his caustic objections to referees' line calls,
had a reputation for giving his opponent the benefit of the doubt on line calls during
unsupervised matches. Frank Deford, So, Why Can't You Smile?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June
25, 1984, at 70, 74. A fierce competitor, McEnroe nevertheless appreciated the fact that
unsupervised play was the time when the community of tennis players could least afford
excessive partisanship. Centripetal forces (i.e., the officials) could keep him in check on
Wimbledon's Centre Court. It was the unsupervised play, in which most of us hackers
regularly engage, that required self-restraint.
117 
"Character is what you are in the dark." Dwight Moody, American evangelist (1837-
1899). ROBERT ANDREWS, THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 42 (1992).
"The measure of a man's real character is what he would do if he knew he would never be
found out." Lord Macaulay, English historian (1800-1859). Id.
118 One of the few redeeming aspects of the post-election imbroglio between Messrs.
Bush and Gore in 2000 was the civilized conduct of their attorneys in the courtroom. Peter
Aronson, Inside the Winning Side, NAT. L.J., Jan. 8, 2001, at Al; Georgene M. Vairo, Bush
v. Gore, NAT. L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A16. Their shortcomings outside the courtroom,
however, were another matter. The failure of the Bush and Gore legal teams-including two
former secretaries of state-to engage in meaningful discussion so as to terminate the
controversy with a minimum of harm to the polity borders on the tragic.
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game, tilt the playing field, and place their thumbs on the scales of justice.
Lawyers, under a professional obligation to zealously represent their clients119
and under economic pressure to do their clients' bidding, follow suit. Litigation
becomes not a device to obtain a fair, impartial determination of a dispute, but a
tool to browbeat others into submission. Discovery is used not to obtain
information necessary for a fair trial and reasonable assessment of one's case;
instead it is used to harass and burden one's opponent. A jury is seen not as a
group of citizens from whom one might obtain a fair and unbiased decision;
instead, a jury trial is perceived as an opportunity to pack the tribunal with
people whose perceived biases might be most favorable to one's cause. The
disputants do not really want a fair and unbiased decision; they want to win,
sometimes at all costs. And lawyers are viewed as their champions, responsible
not for fair play, but for victory.
Second: In a way, it is not surprising that a contest based on principle and
ordered rules of conduct can sometimes deteriorate into an ugly clash of
unbridled emotions and egos. Lawyers told to serve as their clients' champions
can easily convince themselves of the justness of their clients' causes120 and the
utter depravity of any party or advocate who comes in their way.121 Months of
119 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (1998) ("A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1997) ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.").
120 "In general, people have great difficulty divorcing themselves from their
idiosyncratic role sufficiently to take an objective view of disputes in which they are
involved." Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 14 (1999). "Even when negotiators possess
complete and shared information, they tend to assess the strength of their case in a self-
interested (or "egocentric") manner." Id. "In one study, participants were randomly assigned
to roles in a negotiation simulation involving a wage dispute between labor and
management." Id. (citing Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROC. 176 (1992)).
Both groups were given identical background information and asked to negotiate under
the threat that a costly strike would occur if they failed to reach an agreement. Prior to
negotiating, both groups were asked what they thought was a fair wage from the vantage
point of a neutral third party. Despite the fact that both groups had been provided
identical information, participants tended to be biased in a self-interested direction; that
is, they tended to think a neutral third party would favor their side.
Id. at 14-15.
121 Simon observes: "The client's own ends are reduced to crude pretexts for the
standard partisan approach the lawyer takes on behalf of all his clients. The lawyer
maneuvers the client into a role defined in terms of a formal, undifferentiated
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petty encounters with a counterpart who may very well view it as her function
to thwart the adversary at every turn can build into genuine hostility. The rules
of engagement are often blurred; it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an
honest request for accommodation from a dilatory tactic, or to differentiate
between a genuine need for information and abusive discovery. And a
willingness to view one's adversary as evil-fueled by pre-existing antagonism
between the clients whose causes the lawyers have adopted as their own-
disposes lawyers to view one another's conduct in the worst light possible. 122
The problem is exacerbated by the growing size and diversity of the profession,
a healthy development in most respects, but also one that reduces the
opportunities for informal encounters between professional adversaries. 123 This
erosion of bonding social capital renders attorneys less able to build bridging
social capital where it might do their clients the most good.124
The transformation of legal practice has played a significant role in this
decline in behavior and the concomitant decline in social capital. Others have
previously commented on the decline in stability of social networks with the
increase in one-time-only encounters among lawyers.125 With less intimacy in
hostility.. which results from the other lawyer's partisanship." Simon, supra note 47, at
125.
122 Lawyers, like their clients, may engage in reactive devaluation-a tendency to
regard proposals offered by one's adversary less favorably. See Birke & Fox, supra note 120,
at 48-49; Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 235, 246-47 (1993); Lee Ross &
Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389,394-95 (1991).
123 Professor Glendon very perceptively notes:
Today's lawyers wander in an increasingly impersonal, bureaucratized legal world,
where neither honesty-based nor loyalty-based systems seem to be operating very well.
The families, communities, neighborhoods, and schools that once served as seedbeds
and anchors for personal and professional virtues are themselves in considerable
disarray. Clients, whether corporate or individual, are in the grip of the same maladies.
New recruits to today's profession often have no solid base of old world, old Wasp, or
any other culture to fall back on-and no coherent professional culture to embrace.
Emancipated from the old ways, they soldier on, with few examples, sketchy guidance,
and little reinforcement. In such circumstances, is it remarkable that short-term self-
interest often prevails?
GLENDON, NATION, supra note 35, at 83.
124 Our earlier observations regarding the value of dense social networks are
particularly appropriate with respect to the legal profession. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 at 537-41
(1994). Empirical evidence is buttressed by anecdotal evidence. A friend and former student
of mine who is a partner in a large Philadelphia law firm recently commented to me about the
mores of litigators in New York and Philadelphia as compared to those in Scranton and
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the profession, "lawyers worry less about their own reputation for honesty, and
knowing this, they... trust one another less and cooperate less."1 26 A decline
in informal interaction-at bar meetings, 27 community social events, and the
numerous civic activities which Putnam has documented and in which lawyers
have historically played a vital role-leaves lawyers with fewer and fewer
strands of social capital to draw upon. Increasingly, lawyers view one another
not as brothers and sisters jointly involved in a noble calling, but simply as
adversaries and competitors scrambling for the same dollar.
There is every reason for the legal profession to resist the exclusionary guild
practices that were prevalent a century ago. But there is value in bonds forged
through shared knowledge, common training, accepted norms of behavior, and
respect for the law, societal institutions, and one another. In recent years,
lawyers have made deliberate efforts to build bonding social capital within the
profession. The American Inns of Court serve as perhaps the most prominent
example of this phenomenon. Through the Inns, judges, trial lawyers and law
students convene on a monthly basis to dine, converse informally, and
participate in a presentation (often humorous) involving some aspect of
litigation practice or ethics. 128 This predominantly social ritual can have
Reading. Simply put, you are less inclined to be rude to someone you are likely to encounter
in a subsequent transaction or, for that matter, at your child's soccer game or piano recital.
126 PUTNAM, supra note 3, at 147 (citing Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 125). Compare,
e.g., the behavior in the diamond industry, with its tight bonding social capital. See supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
127 Many of the organized activities of the bar associations themselves have, as a
collateral but significant benefit, the forging of bonds between attorneys who at times may
confront one another across a courtroom or negotiating table. Unfortunately, these activities
have experienced a Putnamesque decline in participation by younger lawyers, pressed by
their law firms' demand for more billable hours and juicier bottom lines. Senior partners who
bemoan the decline in civility in their profession had best consider how a more benign regard
for the activities of their associates might have a positive effect on the profession's bonding
social capital.
128 "The mission of the American Inns of Court is to foster excellence in
professionalism, ethics, civility, and legal skills for judges, lawyers, academicians, and
students of the law in order to perfect the quality, availability and efficiency ofjustice in the
United States." American Inns of Court Foundation, General Information: Mission and
Goals, at http://www.innsofcourt.org/ (last viewed, Sept. 29, 2002).
The goals of the American Inns of Court include:
To facilitate the exchange of ideas, experiences, and ongoing education among members
of American Inns of Court, thereby maintaining an institutional forum where judges,
lawyers, academicians, and students of law, working together, may pursue the highest
goals of the legal profession.
To shape a culture of excellence in American jurisprudence by promoting a national
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salutary effect, and the deliberate use ofjudges as team leaders (the practice in
many Inns) reinforces the relationship between bonding social capital and
professionalism. The Red Mass, revived by Roman Catholic lawyers in many
communities, involves a reaffirmation of the profession's commitment to public
service and its spiritual underpinnings. 129 Lest anyone suspect that the Red
Mass involves a clandestine conspiracy of lawyers espousing a single faith,
most such events involve efforts to include lawyers and judges of all faiths,
without diluting the essential ritual that makes the ceremony meaningful to
Catholics.130 Activities of bar associations have a similar salutary effect that
transcends the specific tasks undertaken by their various committees and organs.
Most anything that places one in contact with another lawyer outside the context
of a contested case or transaction allows one to view that lawyer in a more
appreciative light and build social capital that will soften the conflict inherent in
the case or transaction, almost certainly procedurally and perhaps substantively.
Litigation is rarely fun for the disputants. Judge Learned Hand's oft-
repeated statement, "I must say that, as a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit
beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death" 131 remains as true
today as when he uttered it many decades ago. But lawyers, by fighting hard but
fair, can nevertheless use litigation as a means to build social capital and to
model for their clients and others a form of disputing that gives substance to our
society's underlying values. Litigation can thereby knit together community
even as it serves as the ultimate expression of individual rights and interests in a
free society.
commitment to civility, ethics, advocacy skills, and professionalism in the practice of
law, by communicating these ideals to the nation and the world, and by transmitting
these values from one generation to the next.
Id.
129
The Red Mass is a centuries-old tradition, a prayer whereby the guidance and
blessing of the Holy Spirit are invoked upon the work of justice in society. As a
universal prayer, the Red Mass has been attended by monarchs, by the judges and
justices of the highest courts, by legislators at all levels, by diplomats, professors of the
law, and by legal professionals, regardless of their religious background and political
ideologies.
Program for Red Mass, Saint Patrick Cathedral, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Oct. 2, 2001.
130 1 once received an invitation to a Red Mass issued by several area judges, among
others. That, I thought, involved too great an overlap of church and state; lawyers might have
obtained the impression that they were being summoned to attend a religious ceremony.
Subsequent invitations in my locality have been more sensitive to this issue. Judges visibly
participate in the ceremony (originally designed primarily for the benefit of the judiciary),
but do not "take attendance."
131 Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary at the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1982), in 68
A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
66
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B. Arbitration: When Is a Choice not a Choice?
As an adjudicative process, arbitration shares many of the characteristics of
traditional courtroom litigation., One of its important distinguishing
characteristics, for purposes of our discussion, is the manner in which
participants enter the process. For the most part, parties to arbitration engage in
the process by agreement,, entered into either before or after the dispute arose.
There are at least two communitarian implications of this: (1) the parties have
deliberately chosen to avoid the public court system; and (2) the parties have
affirmatively chosen a process with characteristics of their own design.
Therefore, if we see the submission of disputes to the public court system as an
affirmation of community, should we regard arbitration as the opposite?
In some sense, we might. Often parties opt for arbitration, or its close
cousin, the private trial, out of a sense that all is not well with the public court
system. 132 The parties may wish to avoid the queuing costs, evidentiary
burdens, and other expenses of the public court system. They may prefer
privacy to a public trial and record. They may desire greater control over
selection of the decision-maker and the rules under which the dispute will be
adjudicated, refusing to default to the rules of the state-sponsored system. They
may distrust juries, preferring a decision rendered by a professional, perhaps
one with specialized expertise. Sometimes these preferences reflect an aversion
to the public system of dispute resolution, and an effort to "privatize"justice. 133
But at least as often, these preferences are peculiar to the circumstances of the
underlying dispute or relationship between the parties. And none of them go to
the substantive rules applied by the courts or the fundamental legitimacy of the
public court system. While the standard of review of arbitral awards is narrow,
arbitrators generally are expected to apply the same substantive legal rules used
by the courts. 134 And parties to arbitration ultimately utilize the courts as their
enforcement mechanism once an award is rendered. 13 5 Thus, arbitration may be
seen as an alternative forum with simplified procedures and greater party
control over the ground rules, but which remains part and parcel of the same
132 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 43, at 234; RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note
108, at 570-72.
133 RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 108, at 570-72.
134 "[T]he streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential
restriction on substantive ights.... [T]here is no reason to assume at the outset that
arbitrators will not follow the law ... " Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
13 5 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § § 8(b), 11,
7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
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overall system and is subject to the same fundamental mores as the public
courts.
136
Furthermore, arbitration may be the choice of micro-communities seeking to
maintain their internal equilibrium. As discussed previously, trade groups,
employers and unions, and religious organizations often use a form of
arbitration to maintain order within their own houses without the public display,
time consumption, and disruption of full-blown litigation. 137 This choice is not
so much a rejection of the larger community's institutions as it is a means of
affirming the smaller community and maintaining its equilibrium so that it may
function more effectively within the larger community. 138 A desire not to
launder one's linen publicly may, in fact, suggest a sensitivity to the proper role
of public institutions designed to adjudicate those conflicts that spill over the
lines that define smaller groupings.
There is, however, an insidious side to arbitration as a conflict resolution
process "choice": in many instances, it is not really a choice at all. During the
past twenty years, employers, brokerage firms, and other corporations have been
inserting arbitration provisions into agreements with employees and customers
as a matter of course. The enforceability of these agreements has been upheld by
the courts, in cases ranging from allegations of breach of warranty to claims of
136 "Adjudication we may define as a social process of decision which assures to the
affected party a particular form or participation, that of presenting proofs and arguments for a
decision in his favor." Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L.
REV. 3, 19. In this sense, arbitration and courtroom litigation have much in common.
137 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
138 A classic example is provided by the National War Labor Board (NWLB),
established during World War II "to prevent interruptions of any work that contributed to the
effective prosecution of the war, to avoid all strikes and lockouts, and to make sure that all
disputes were settled by peaceful means." Symposium, An Oral History of the National War
Labor Board and Critical Issues in the Development of Modern Grievance Arbitration, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 522 (1988-89). The NWLB reflected a policy that the private
parties in a labor dispute were best able to settle their grievances with a minimum of
government intervention. Id. at 510-11. This policy preference, in combination with the
volume of cases subject to the jurisdiction of the NWLB, set the stage for final and binding
grievance arbitration becoming the principal means for parties to settle grievance disputes.
Id. at 511-13.
The rise of the labor movement following World War II and the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act "led to the creation of a federal common law of labor arbitration that inspired
judicial enforcement of both agreements to arbitrate and most arbitration awards." Id. at 534.
Observers state that "[p]erhaps the Board's most important contribution to modem labor
arbitration was the development of a body of experienced arbitrators, many of whom
remained active after the War." Id. at 534-35. The National Academy of Arbitrators, founded
in 1947, "helped to institutionalize the practice of labor arbitration and to build up a cadre of
experienced arbitrators generally acceptable to both unions and employers." Id. at 535.
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illegal discrimination. 139 Were these truly matters of choice, many a thoughtful
consumer or employee might opt for contractual terms providing for an
informal, less costly process like arbitration over a formal, costly jury trial.140
But more often, the consumer or employee becomes aware of these fine print
provisions only after the dispute arises. 141 And rather than finding herself in a
forum constructed by the participants or their representatives (as in labor
grievance or trade association arbitration), the employee or customer more often
than not finds herself in unfamiliar surroundings contrived by the employer or
corporation, sometimes in conjunction with a "neutral" eager for repeat
business. Such "arbitration by ambush" or "adhesion arbitration" (as one of my
students described these arrangements) lacks the "buy-in" characteristics of
other arbitration systems we have described. Rather than helping to build micro-
communities, these arrangements force participants out of the socially accepted
court system and into a system not truly of their own choosing. The trappings of
due process are present, but it is doubtful that many participants feel as if they
have had the fair bite at the apple to which they had been told they were entitled
since grade school. 142
139 E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (Truth in Lending
claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (age discrimination
claim); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (securities and
RICO claims); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (antitrust claim). In addition, Congress has endorsed arbitration in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12212 (1995).
140 For an economic argument in favor of such provisions, see Christopher R. Drahozal,
"Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695,741-46. Others have argued that if
arbitration is indeed attractive to consumers and employees, they would agree to it after the
dispute arises, and there is no need to compel them into arbitration based on a pre-dispute
arbitration provision. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Steps Need to be Taken to Prevent
Unfairness to Employees, Consumers, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 5, 7. But this
argument ignores the potential cost reductions that might be produced by pre-dispute
arbitration provisions incorporated into all like transactions.
141 An example of this is "arbitration in a box," in which a consumer opens a carton
containing a product (e.g., a computer), and lying somewhere in the packing material,
instructions and promotional material is an agreement to the effect that the consumer has, by
accepting the product, agreed to arbitrate any and all claims involving the product.
142 Courts have refused to uphold some of the more one-sided provisions of these
arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,938-39 (4th
Cir. 1999) (mechanism for selecting arbitrators one-sided); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (arbitration fee too high); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,691-94 (Cal. 2000) (clause allowed one party, but
not the other, to go to court); Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245-46
(Mont. 1998) (location of arbitration too distant); see Drahozal, supra note 140, at 697-98,
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Our ideal construct of arbitration is further compromised in another way.
Businesses are increasingly inserting arbitration clauses into commercial
agreements, based on a general sense that they are better off avoiding the burden
and expense of traditional litigation. 143 But too often the clauses are little more
than boilerplate, with scant thought given to the types of choices that allow the
parties to tailor arbitration to their unique circumstances. 144 In these instances, it
seems that the parties have not so much opted into arbitration as they have opted
out of traditional courtroom litigation. A little thought as to motivation could go
a long way here. Might the parties prefer arbitration so that they can preserve an
ongoing relationship? Might they prefer a decision-maker who is familiar with
the practices of their trade, perhaps a community "insider"? Is speed or finality
important? Is a legally correct decision imperative, or is it merely important that
the parties obtain a decision and get on with their business? Might a party
somehow lose face in the community by making a concession that would
nevertheless be acceptable if imposed by an arbitrator? By addressing these
issues in their arbitration provisions, the parties (or at least their counsel) might
be forced to consider which aspects of their relationship they deem important,
and examine their underlying values. They might thereby build a stronger
relationship, whether or not they ever avail themselves of the chosen conflict
resolution mechanism. And if conflict forces them into such a mechanism, they
will proceed with the knowledge that it has been tailored to address those
aspects of the relationship they consider important, and to emphasize the
underlying values (including community norms) they hold most dear.
From a communitarian standpoint, the advantage of arbitration lies in the
consciousness of the choice. A knowing, deliberate selection of process is more
715-20 (collecting and discussing cases). Partially in response to this, some of the leading
arbitration institutions have taken steps to insure the fairness of arbitrations they administer.
See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (Apr.
17,1998), available at http://www.adr.org/ JAMS, POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION,
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (rev. Sept. 10, 2002), at
http://www.jamsadr.com/employmentArb_minstds.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). It
appears that the arbitration community has engaged in'some self-policing.
143 This phenomenon is most prominent in international commercial agreements, where
concern about potentially biased national courts and enforceability of judgments makes
arbitration "the generally accepted private legal process applicable to transnational business
disputes." Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business
Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 27, 59 (1995).
144 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 44, at 241. Ironically, it is in the "adhesion
arbitration" situation where arbitration clauses most often depart from boilerplate, with
provisions circumscribing the selection of arbitrators, locating the arbitration on the drafter's
home turf, or even giving the drafter alone the option to litigate in court. Drahozal, supra
note 140, at 715-20; cf supra note 132.
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likely to foster community than a process that is either thrust upon the parties or
accepted with no more than a shrug of the shoulder. Conscious choice implies
commitment-in this case, a commitment to walk a chosen path together, even
while engaged in conflict. Conflict is a burden, to be sure, but the knowing
embrace of a process is more likely to transform a dispute into an opportunity
for growth rather than an affliction to be endured.
C. Mediation: Taking Responsibility
At least two aspects of mediation (and its unassisted cousin, negotiation)
distinguish that process from adjudicative processes for purposes of
communitarian analysis. First, while the adjudicative processes include elements
of collaboration, mediation is inherently a collaborative process. As Leonard
Riskin has said, "[m]ediation highlights the interconnectedness of human
beings."'1 45 The engagement involved in most mediation presents more
opportunities for the creation of social capital. Secondly, as adjudicative
processes, both the public trial process and arbitration have in common the
placement of ultimate responsibility for decision-making on a third party who is
not directly involved in the dispute. Negotiated and mediated settlements, in
contrast, require that the disputants take responsibility for the ultimate outcome.
While these characteristics create opportunities for community building, they
also pose special challenges from a communitarian perspective.
1. Challenges Stemmingfrom the Inherently Collaborative Nature of
Mediation
The collaborative nature of mediation suggests a "friendlier" process that,
under ideal circumstances, should promote an atmosphere more conducive to
community building than the adversarial, "winner-take-all" nature of
adjudicative processes. A process in which the disputants work together to
produce a mutually acceptable outcome should, ideally, be easier on the psyche;
the paradigm is that of several people congregating around a circular table,
exchanging ideas and solving problems together, rather than exchanging glares
across an emotionally charged courtroom. 146 The process can be inherently
145 Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 58 (1982).
146 Speaking more generally about perceptions of alternative dispute resolution (ADR),
Professor Judith Resnik has noted, "ADR is perceived to be friendly, flexible and nicer than
the uncivil exchanges that characterize litigation .... Conversation and cooperation replace
conflict; informality empowers." Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative
Dispute Resolution andAdjudication, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211,246, 249 (1995).
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fulfilling, and can provide the parties with the tools to resolve future problems,
develop relationships, and build social capital. 147
But collaboration can be hard work. Just as the Jeffersonian concept of
citizen engagement is more difficult to master than the Madisonian blocking
function, so too is a process that requires parties to collaborate with one another,
make difficult choices, and take responsibility for the result. In particular:
* Mediation ideally involves direct communication. The parties (and, if
they are present, their lawyers) are seated at the same table, and are
expected to look at each other, face-to-face. 148 Whereas in the
courtroom, direct communication between the parties, and even their
attorneys, is discouraged; in mediation this form of engagement is
encouraged, and usually is considered integral to the process. 149 While
a lawyer, another advocate or even the mediator herself might provide
support and protection, ideally the parties engage in the process first-
hand, hiding behind neither a formal procedure nor a champion.150 This
can be an extremely difficult experience, particularly if one believes to
have been wronged or unjustly accused of wrongdoing by the other
147 Mediated and negotiated settlements might also be "manifestations of a single
cultural value: the preference for private ordering over public control." Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 4 (1996). To the extent this cultural preference indicates a distaste for government
control over our lives (as distinguished from a rejection of legal norms), it may be seen as
consistent with the anti-authoritarian aspects of communitarianism.
148 "Settlement is a process of reconciliation in which the anger of broken relationships
is to be confronted rather than avoided, and in which healing demands not a truce but
confrontation." Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE
L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985).
149 This engagement tends to be less of a factor when the parties remain in separate
caucuses for most of the process, with the mediator engaging in shuttle diplomacy. This
technique is most prevalent in labor mediation, which is rather odd, in that labor mediation
ideally would provide an excellent opportunity for the parties to build social capital that will
be mutually beneficial in the course of their working relationship.
150 Admittedly, mediation does not always proceed in this manner. Sometimes the
parties do little or no speaking for themselves, leaving it to their lawyers to do the talking.
And in some instances, most of the mediation proceeds with the parties and their counsel
sitting in separate rooms, with the mediator engaging in shuttle diplomacy. See Welsh,
Making Deals, supra note 12, at 810-11. It is my experience that where the parties and their
counsel are given the choice, they often gravitate toward this style of mediation, and the
mediator (despite training to the contrary) often accedes to the parties' preference. Why? In
part, because the mediator may wish to defer to the disputants' judgment, citing a desire for
self-determination. But it is also easier to proceed this way: easier for the parties to endure,
easier for the mediator to manage. Sometimes it is even easier to arrive at a settlement,
superficial as it may be. But disputes that are mediated in this manner, while often settled, are
rarely resolved.
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* The confrontation inherent in mediation is not only physical; it is
mental. The mutual accommodation sought in mediation requires that
one cease to demonize the other party and overcome cognitive
dissonance 152 so as to give credence to a view of the world that may be
inconsistent with the scheme of the world that one has previously
adopted. This often requires a level of receptivity, maturity and self-
awareness not easily arrived at.153
151 In some instances, this direct confrontation is considered so difficult as to be
abusive. Spousal abuse is a leading example; in fact, mediation is usually discouraged in
family disputes where serious abuse is suspected. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1584 (1991); see also
Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce
Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 203-04 (1994) ("Abusive relationships pose severe problems
of power imbalance during mediation ... When [risk aversion, guilt at initiating the divorce,
low self-esteem, low expectations, depression, and passivity] are coupled with the gripping
terror experienced by many battered spouses in the presence of their tormentors, mediation
clearly is inappropriate."). But cf Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L.
REV. 467 (1991) (defending use of mediation in family disputes).
While victim/offender reconciliation programs have enjoyed significant success, such
programs do not subject crime victims to the mediation process without their express and
informed consent. See Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 671, 710 (1999).
152
[Cognitive dissonance is a theory] of attitude change that assumes a person behaves
in a way which will maximize the internal consistency of his or her cognitive
system and that groups also strive to maximize the internal consistency of their
interpersonal relations .... The core of the theory is deceptively simple: two
cognitive elements (thoughts, attitude, beliefs) are said to be in a dissonant relation,
if the obverse of one would follow from the other. Because dissonance is
psychologically uncomfortable, its existence will motivate a person to reduce it and
achieve consonance. Further, when dissonance is present, a person will actively
avoid situations and information that would be likely to increase it.
THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 93 (Rom Harrd et al. eds., 1983) (citing
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)). For a criticism of the
theory of cognitive dissonance, see CHAPANIS, N. & L. CHAPANIS, Cognitive Dissonance:
Five Years Later, 61 PSYCHOL. BUL. 1-22 (1964). For discussion regarding the mental
dissonance that occurs when a lawyer attempts to serve as both advocate and settlement
counsel, see Douglas H. Yam, supra note 90, at 77-78; William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for
Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 367, 369 (1999); Gary Mendelsohn,
Note, Lawyers as Negotiators, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139 (1996). For a discussion of the
roots of this problem in the training of lawyers, see Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System ofLaw
Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 582-83 (1983).
153 Lawyer/mediator Gary Gill-Auster writes:
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Mediation requires that the parties perform the hard work of reconciling
interests. Unlike war (which determines who is stronger) or litigation (which
determines who is right, or more precisely, whose position is in conformity with
legal norms), mediation requires a mutual accommodation of interests. 154 One
rarely has one's interests accommodated without revealing them, and this, too,
can be difficult, because revealing one's true interests makes one vulnerable to
exploitation. 155 And one may be especially reluctant to reveal those interests to
someone who is viewed as'an adversary. 156
It is therefore not surprising that the paradigm of mediation as a
collaborative process has undergone small and large compromises, such as the
employment of lawyers as primary spokespersons, extensive use of private
caucuses in lieu ofjoint sessions, and resort to distributive bargaining tactics. 157
While the "lawyerization" of mediation is one explanation of this
phenomenon, 158 the social anxiety sometimes produced by direct confrontation
Participation in mediation is threatening. It is the threat of being in charge of one's life;
the threat of considering the possibility of being fully conscious-fully conscious of
breaches that cannot be repaired, harms that one has committed and likely will continue
to perpetrate, recognition of what "is" and what cannot be massaged or cosmetically
covered up. Mediation is a call to genuineness. We touch it, we live in it occasionally at
best, oftentimes reluctantly, but having touched it, there is never regret. That parties and
their lawyers want evaluation underscores the threat that participation in mediation
presents to people. It is a tough act, this idea of being an adult.
Gary L. Gill-Austem, Faithful, 2000 J. DisP. RES. 343, 350.
154 This process is more difficult for the neutral as well. President Bill Clinton described
his efforts to mediate peace in the Middle East as the hardest work he had ever done.
President's Remarks on Departure for Okinawa, Japan, and an Exchange with Reporters in
Thurmont, Maryland, 36 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1655 (July 20,
2000). And on a far less global scale, I have found work as a mediator far more difficult than
work as an arbitrator, in terms of both process management and resolution of substantive
issues.
155 DAVID A. LAx & JAMES K. SEBENIUs, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 29-35 (1986).
156 This is where the private caucus can be especially useful in mediation. A party can
reveal underlying interests to the mediator (who can thereby explore options that serve these
interests) without at least initially revealing those interests to the other party. Of course, this
requires that the party trust the mediator, which may not occur instantly.
157 Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 12, at 799-805, 809-16. Worse still, in some
instances, disputants and their lawyers use mediation to "smoke the other side out," drag out
litigation, increase opponents' costs, and wear down the opposition, with little intention of
settling the dispute. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods as an Alternative
to Good Faith Requirements in Court Mediation Programs, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2002).
158 Id; see also UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2001) §§ 4-7 (creating ornate system of
mediation privileges and exceptions), § 10 (establishing right to an attorney or other
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with one's adversary must also play a role in this behavior. 159 No wonder
parties to mediation often go through the motions, participating in mediation in
form, but continuing to speak through proxies, removing to different rooms, and
failing to shift from positional bargaining to a focus on underlying interests.
They participate, but they do not engage.160 Frequently, they reach settlement
(often because the alternatives are regarded as worse), but not resolution of their
underlying problems. 16 1 To employ Putnam's metaphor, they go to the public
bowling alley, but then insist on bowling alone. Very few strands of social
capital are woven through such a process.
2. Challenges Stemming From Party Responsibility for the Ultimate
Outcome
A process in which the outcome is consensual, that is, one that is imposed
on the parties by the parties themselves, should normally be preferred to one in
which the outcome is imposed by an external agency, such as a court. 16 2 People
usually are better equipped to order their lives and resolve problems on their
own accord, in conformity to their own standards and the understanding that
they uniquely possess regarding their own circumstances, rather than resorting
representative); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995)
(advocating participation of lawyers in divorce mediation sessions).
159
Social anxiety is anxiety resulting from the prospect or presence of interpersonal
evaluation in real or imagined social settings .... [A]nxiety refers to a cognitive-
affective response characterized by physiological arousal (indicative of sympathetic
nervous system activation) and apprehension regarding a potentially negative
outcome that the individual perceives as impending. Thus, social anxiety is defined
here as a subjective experience of nervousness and dread.... There is, of course,
no doubt that episodes of social anxiety are often accompanied by particular
patterns of overt behavior... [w]hen socially anxious, people often speak less,
engage in less eye contact with others, appear nervous, withdraw from the
encounter, and so on.
MARK R. LEARY, SocialAnxiety, in REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 97,
98-100 (Ladd Wheeler ed., 1982).
160 See Hensler, supra note 25, at 164-65.
161 Id. at 166-71.
162 Note that arbitration has aspects of both types of process. While the outcome is
imposed by someone outside the dispute, it is an agency of the parties' own choosing,
applying procedural rules (and sometimes substantive rules) of the parties' own making.
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to legal machinery. 163 The courts ideally should be regarded as default
mechanisms to be employed only where the parties themselves cannot find a
better way.164 But the employment ofjudicial machinery does allow the parties
to escape responsibility and to blame a "bad" result on an outside agency. 165
163 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has tried to catalogue the ways in which
settlement may (at least in some cases) be preferable to a court-imposed outcome. Among
them:
Settlements that are in fact consensual represent the goals of democratic and party-
initiated legal regimes by allowing the parties themselves to choose processes and
outcomes .... Settlements permit a broader range of possible solutions that may be
more responsive to both party and system needs .... [C]ompromise may... represent a
moral commitment to equality, precision in justice, accommodation, and peaceful
coexistence of conflicting interests .... Settlements may be based on important
nonlegal principles or interests, which may, in any given case, be as important or more
important to the parties than "legal" considerations. Laws made in the aggregate may
not always be appropriate in particular cases .... Settlement processes may be more
humanely "real," democratic, participatory, and cathartic than more formalized
processes, permitting in their best moments, transformative and educational
opportunities for parties in dispute as well as for others .... [Slome settlement
processes may... provide both more and better (not just legally relevant) information
for problem-solving ....
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2692 (1995).
164 McThenia and Shaffer go so far as to suggest that the courts play, at most, a
marginal role in dispensing justice:
Justice is not usually something people get from the government. And
courts... are not the only or even the most important places that dispense
justice .... Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not efficiency in government; it is
not the reduction of violence: justice is what we discover-you and I, Socrates said-
when we walk together, listen together, and even love one another, in our curiosity
about what justice is and where justice comes from.
McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 58, at 1664-65.
165 Again, arbitration allows this, but subjects the parties to the reminder that the outside
agency was of their own choosing. Statutorily mandated arbitration (most often employed in
the context of public sector labor disputes) allows the parties to blame the outcome on the
neutral and the process on the legislature. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-276a (West
1998) (interest arbitration for certain state employees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West
2001) (interest arbitration for certain public employees); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.4
(West 1992) (interest arbitration for police and firefighters).
In a study of practice under the New Jersey interest arbitration statute, Richard Lester
'guesstimates' that one half to two thirds of conventional arbitrations in New Jersey in
the year 1987 were in effect agreed-upon awards disguised as contested awards, and that
one fifth to one eighth of final offer arbitration awards fell in this category.
Scott Buchheit, Interest Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1990: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON OLD
ISSUES 171, 176 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1991) (citing Richard A. Lester, Analysis of
Experience Under New Jersey's Flexible Arbitration System, ARB. J., June 1989, at 14, 20).
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Consensual dispute resolution processes like negotiation and mediation require
that the disputants assume responsibility for the result and the hard choices that
must be made along the way. In particular:
* Mediation requires that the parties make difficult choices. It is the rare
instance in which all interests can be perfectly accommodated. Far
more prevalent is the dispute that requires compromise. The parties
must have the maturity to accept the idea of compromise and must be
able to make judgments regarding the soundness of the proposed
compromise. It is not always easy to discern whether a particular
compromise is a prudent accommodation or an unfair capitulation.
* Consensual dispute resolution processes require that the parties
ultimately make a decision and take responsibility for the result, not
delegate it to a neutral decision-maker upon whom they can cast blame.
This may be particularly difficult in organizations, such as corporations,
in which managers seek comfort in appearing not to have made
unpopular decisions or be responsible for imperfect outcomes. Because
most members of the organization will not have participated first-hand
in the discussions leading to the decision, they may not fully appreciate
its prudence, and the decision is therefore likely to be unpopular. And
because mediation almost invariably means compromise, the outcome
is likely to be imperfect. For some managers, the unwillingness to take
responsibility means the more "comfortable" default to an adjudicative
process. Disputes involving individuals are also subject to this
phenomenon, as some people may not wish to come to grips with hard
choices and take responsibility for the direction of their lives. Better to
play the victim and blame the course of events on someone else: a
demonized adversary, a biased court, an ill-informed arbitrator. But (as
suggested at the beginning of this section), "not to decide is to
decide." 166 The "non-decision" to default to an adjudicative process
(and allow an outsider to control one's destiny) is itself one with
consequences for which one ought to take responsibility. But because a
decision to litigate is considered within the norm of American disputing
behavior, and because of the diffusion of responsibility in many
"If his guesstimate is correct, many awards are in reality settlements between the parties, but
for which the arbitrator is asked to bear responsibility." Id.
166 Harvey Cox,from Laurence J. Peter, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 297 (1977). Or, in words
taken from a more contemporary source,
"Ifyou choose not to decide
You still have made a choice."
Rush, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Uni/Mercury Records 1980).
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organizations, few are held to account for the result. 167 Thus the
expenditure of vast sums on litigation goes unchecked and
unquestioned.' 68
Of course, the fact that mediation allows people to be governed by their
own decisions should be considered an asset, notwithstanding the difficulties it
might entail. Mediation enhances autonomy, and therefore has the virtue of
giving people control over their own lives. But the type of autonomy ideally
enhanced by mediation is not the selfish form of autonomy in which the
disputant's own interests are pursued to the exclusion of all other
considerations. 169 Rather, it is the type of autonomy that requires one to take
into account the rights and interests of others. It is a responsible form of
autonomy that embraces the fact that one lives not as an independent unit in a
land of strangers, but as a member of a community, with interwoven networks
of responsibility. In that sense, mediation serves communitarian ends not
advanced through litigation, where responsibility for the interests of others is
ceded to the tribunal. 170
3. Interest-Based Mediation: Empowerment and Recognition Versus
Self-Absorption
The emphasis on interests in facilitative mediation' 71 may create special
167 The fragmentation of responsibility within law firms representing parties in conflict
further contributes to the inability of disputants to recognize alternatives to a litigated
outcome. Associates often interpret their responsibilities narrowly (taking a deposition,
researching a brief, or readying a case for trial); partners assigning these responsibilities
often assume that the associate has taken charge of the day-to-day work; neither takes on a
periodic reassessment of options, nor does either take a pro-active stance regarding
alternative processes.
168 There is healthy indication that this is less and less the case with respect to the
disputing behavior of American corporations. See David Hechler, ADR Finds True Believers,
NAT'L L.J., July 2, 2001 ,at A l (describing efforts of Philadelphia Electric Company general
counsel James W. Durham and others to institutionalize alternative methods of dispute
resolution in their companies).
169 For a discussion of the type of self-centered autonomy that "treat[s] others as means
and not as ends," see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 18.
170 See KEMMIS, supra note 81, at 53.
171 Professor Leonard L. Riskin has suggested a continuum of mediator orientations
based on whether the mediator is more facilitative or evaluative. The facilitative mediator
helps promote communication between the parties, helps them to understand their interests,
and helps them to develop proposals. The evaluative mediator is more likely to predict
litigated outcomes and propose terms of agreement. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). Professor Riskin's continuum has generated a great deal of
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challenges from a communitarian perspective. The interests-based paradigm
suggests that the mediator should encourage the parties to reveal their
underlying interests (either in joint session or through private caucus); with
those interests on the table, the mediator can then help the parties explore
options that will satisfy the interests of all. 172 At times, such exploration will
reveal interests that are overlapping, or at least interests that can be reconciled,
allowing for value creation and win-win solutions.
. The oft-repeated allegory is that of two sisters fighting over an orange.
Their father, attempting to emulate the wisdom of Solomon, proposes to cut the
orange in half. Their mother fortunately intervenes and asks the sisters why they
want the orange. She learns that one sister wants to use the peel for icing on a
cake, and the other wants to extract juice from the orange. The win-win solution
is so obvious as to not require explanation. 73
A nice story, to be sure. The problem with this allegory is that it over
promises the benefits of mediation, creating in the parties unrealistic
expectations regarding the mediator's "magic" and unrealistic assumptions
regarding their own need to compromise.174 In this regard, mediators may have
become victims of our own self-promotion. Having touted an interest-based
comment and debate regarding mediators' orientations and techniques. See, e.g., Symposium,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997) (series of articles on mediator orientations).
172 The philosophy underlying this methodology is best described in ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 75-76
(Bruce Patton ed., 1981), and has been hailed by many (including this author) as a means of
pursuing "principled negotiation." Id. at xii-xiii. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5, at 686-
89. I have explained earlier how parties may be less reluctant to reveal their underlying
interests in private caucus with a neutral, rather than in joint session with the opposing party.
See supra note 156.
173 The fable of the two sisters and the orange has been repeated so often that its origin
is difficult to trace. My beleaguered research assistant attributes it to Robert House. See
Deborah M. Kolb, The Love for Three Oranges or: What Did We Miss About Ms. Follett in
the Library?, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 339, 339 (1995) (noting that Robert House originated the
tale of the two sisters and the orange. ROBERT HOUSE, EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 130-33 (1982)).
174 In over fifteen years as a mediator (and the father of two beautiful, strong-willed
daughters), I have yet to meet the two sisters with the orange. I have met disputing parties
with the maturity to recognize that they might have to give up something in order to acquire
or retain something of equal or greater importance. I have also encountered disputants and
(less often) lawyers who expect me to conjure up a magic formula to create additional value
and thereby obviate their need to compromise.
It is possible that I have indeed met these sisters, but have failed to recognize them. But
I have sometimes identified seemingly reconcilable interests, only to be told that, for some
reason or other, the win-win solution was more apparent than real.
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process spawning win-win solutions, we are sometimes stymied when the
parties and their counsel expect us to deliver a solution that requires no
compromise on their part.175
But while mediation presents opportunities to create value, enlarge the
"pie," and build win-win solutions, almost every mediated solution involves an
element of compromise. We hold'out false hope, and encourage dependency and
immaturity, when we imply that mediation will relieve people of all
responsibility for hard choices and, in some instances, sacrifice. From a
communitarian perspective, the true promise of mediation, as suggested in
Baruch Bush's and Joseph Folger's book by the same name, involves a process
of empowerment and recognition that shifts disputants from weakness and
dependency to strength, from self-absorption to responsiveness.1 76
Parties encouraged (by mediators or lawyers) to keep their interests
paramount might misconstrue the process, fixate on their narrow interests alone,
and thereby engage in self-indulgence, to the exclusion of values important to
community. Sometimes it is contrary to one's interests to honor the terms of a
contract, compensate another for injury, or do any number of honorable things
important to others or the community at large. Sometimes principles other than
the service of personal interests are important.177 Yet an over-emphasis on the
disputants' respective interests may encourage parties to think of mediation as a
device that will serve those interests alone, neglecting broad-based values and
the compromises that allow a community to function.
175 1 must confess to having once taken part in a panel presentation at a bar meeting,
entitled "Mediation: No Compromise Necessary." Whom were we kidding?
176 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 84-94. Taylor describes this phenomenon in a
political context:
[T]he very definition of a republican regime as classically understood requires an
ontology different from atomism, and which falls outside atomism-infected common
sense. It requires that we probe the relations of identity and community, and distinguish
the different possibilities, in particular, the possible place of we-identities against
merely convergent I-identities, and the consequent role of the common as against
convergent goods.
Charles Taylor, Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND
THE MORAL LIFE 170 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
17 7 Insistence on the right to attend integrated schools must have been a source of much
discomfort to Louise Brown and her parents. Had they and their lawyers looked only at their
short-term interests (or even at those interests together with those of their adversaries), they
might not have pursued the remedy that caused a social revolution, to the betterment of the
community at large.
The integration focus of Brown v. Board and related cases has been criticized, however,
as failing to adequately advance educational goals. See Bell, supra note 75 (questioning
whether civil rights lawyers advanced their own litigation interests at the expense of their
clients' educational goals).
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This is where elements of transformative mediation may be put to good use.
The transformative philosophy emphasizes the importance of empowerment and
recognition during the course of the mediation process. 17 8 The empowerment
element of transformative mediation does not encourage individuals to obtain
power to pursue selfish ends. Rather, it encourages them to take control over
their lives, shed dependency and self-absorption, and exercise responsibility
over their decisions and actions. The goal of empowerment ultimately requires
individuals to behave as mature human beings, as responsible participants in the
community. Recognition, in turn, requires individuals to understand that others
have legitimate interests that cannot be ignored, and that must be addressed in
order for relationships to thrive. Rather than viewing "successful" mediation as
the magical outcome produced by the fortuitous overlap of selfish interests, the
transformative model requires that the parties recognize the legitimate interests
of others and accept responsibility for hard choices; in other words, it requires
that they view themselves as co-participants in an organic community. 179
We might part company with Professors Bush and Folger when they suggest
that "empowerment and -recognition-the transformative dimensions of
mediation-[may] matter as much or more than settlement." 180 Most parties
enter into (and pay for) mediation primarily because it is likely to bring about
the resolution of their disputes. But this does not mean that transformative
elements cannot be applied to facilitative or even evaluative mediation to good
effect for the parties' relationship and the social capital thereby developed.
This view recognizes the difference between supplicants and citizens. It
treats disputants not as children trying to have their cake and eat it too, but as
responsible members of a community. It is the difference between politicians
who ask, "Are you better off now than you were four years ago?"' 8'1 and those
who implore us to "ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can
do for your country."' 182 But it is an attitude that requires maturity and
responsibility, and a world view broader than self-indulgence. It is a view that
178 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 2..Bush and Folger define empowerment as "the
restoration to individuals of a sense of their own value and strength and their own capacity to
handle life's problems." Id. Recognition is defined as "the evocation in individuals of
acknowledgment and empathy for the situation and problems of others." Id.
179 A mature view of community consists not of each sister walking off with that
portion of the orange that will serve her needs alone; it consists of the two sisters sharing the
orange, each compromising her interests for the sakeof the whole.
180 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 4.
181 Standard stump speech of almost any incumbent American politician, circa 1980-
2000.
182 John F. Kennedy, President's Inaugural Address, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 1, 3 (Jan. 20,
1961).
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requires cultivation, because while it is consistent with our more altruistic
instincts, these instincts require nourishment every bit as much as the instinct
for self-maximization.
Where and how is that view to be cultivated? People do not glide seamlessly
into dispute resolution processes. Sometimes community institutions, such as
religious organizations or community-based mediation centers, may be available
to encourage people along a collaborative path. But in our diverse and largely
secular society, people are at least as likely to turn to lawyers for guidance and
assistance when they are in conflict.183 .
! have previously discussed the role that lawyers' relationships with one
another may play in the building of social capital. A discussion of the
interaction between lawyer and client, and its implication for process choices, is
now in order.
V. LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND PROCESS CHOICES
"You take people as far as they will go, not as far as you would like them to
go.
- Jeanette Rankin184
It is plain from the foregoing discussion that the extent to which
communitarian ends are served through conflict resolution depends not only on
choice of process, but also on the manner in which the process is conducted and
the manner in which the disputants conduct themselves in the process. Given
the role of lawyers in transforming raw disputes into process, it is appropriate to
inquire about the role of legal counsel in the making of these choices and in the
ensuing conduct.1 85 it is a simple answer to say that by the time a disputant
reaches a lawyer's office, she has already determined to address the dispute
through conventional litigation, and that for a lawyer to redirect the client
toward an alternative process is a usurpation of client autonomy. But in most
183 Almost two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville commented on the role of law as a
common denominator and the pervasive influence of lawyers in American society. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 215, 251-57 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000). "In America there are neither
nobles nor men of letters, and the people distrust the rich. Lawyers therefore form the
superior political class and the most intellectual portion of society." Id. at 256. For a modem
update on this view, see generally GLENDON, NATION, supra note 35.
184 See Jeanette Rankin, Women's Voices: Quotations by Women, at
http://womenshistory.about.com/library/qu/blqurank.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
185 "The lawyer's formal and practical monopoly over access to the institutions of
authoritative dispute resolution gives him a large measure of power over the client." Simon,
supra note 47, at 116.
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instances, the would-be client, including even'the fairly sophisticated client, has
at best a hazy notion as to (1) whether there are any legal remedies for the
situation; (2) what those remedies might be; (3) how they might best be
pursued; (4) whether there exist any other remedies obtainable through non-
judicial means; and (5) how they might best be pursued.186.With respect to each
of these issues, the answers provided by the attorney or, more appropriately, the
answers reached jointly by the attorney and client together, are critical.
There is no single way in which a lawyer and client might do this. Thomas
L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran, Jr. have suggested four approaches to moral
choices in legal representation. 187 The first of these approaches views the
lawyer as "godfather," a paternalistic approach in which "[t]he . . lawyer seeks
the client's financial benefit, without regard to harm caused to other people and
without serious concern for the client's relationships--or even what the client
really wants."' 8 8 When the lawyer adopts this role, she eliminates the possibility
that the client may have more communitarian instincts. William H. Simon has
said that under this model of advocacy, the lawyer acts "unilaterally in terms of
the imputed ends of [client] selfishness." 189 The lawyer (having failed to fully
assess client values and objectives) may thereby take action contrary to her
client's values, and perhaps contrary to her own.
Shaffer and Cochran's second model is that of lawyer as "hired gun."190
Under this approach, client autonomy is valued to the detriment of all other
values; "[t]he lawyer's job is to empower the client, not to question the client's
morality."' 191 Depending upon one's view, this model of representation may be
186 Some commentators have suggested a predisposition among lawyers to steer clients
toward a litigation remedy. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of
Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DiSp.
RESOL. 25, 33; Riskin, supra note 145, at 43-48.
187 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 3-4.
188 Id. at8.
189 Simon, supra note 47, at 56.
190 See generally SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27.
191 Id. at 16. The traditional apologia for this view is taken from Scottish barrister Lord
Brougham:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 65-66 (1990) (quoting TRIAL
OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (James Cockcroft & Co. 1874)).
More contemporary advocates for this viewpoint include Professors Monroe Freedman
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seen as enlightened (because it promotes self-actualization) 192 or not (because it
promotes self-serving choices). 193 Shaffer and Cochran argue that claims of
neutrality on the part of client-centered counselors "fail to recognize that lawyer
and client moral values are often developed in and as a result of the lawyer-
client relationship."' 194 Perhaps all too often, the lawyer equates the client's self-
actualization with client selfishness; to the extent there is any discussion of
client values, the discussion is steered toward selfish ends, without exploration
of other, more communitarian values.
Certainly there are instances in which clients really do want this type of
representation. Some people indeed wish to push their interests to the maximum
allowed. That is one reason they hire lawyers; they hope that their lawyers will
be contentious on their behalf, whether or not they like being contentious
themselves.1 95 But too often lawyers adopt an unspoken assumption that this
alone is the reason the lawyer has been hired. 196 As a result, a mutual default of
and Charles Fried. See, e.g., id. and Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976). In fairness to
Professors Freedman and Fried, both gentlemen would appear to advocate moral counseling
of the client, but thereafter continued advocacy even where the client rejects such moral
counsel. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 25.
192 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 19 (quoting ROBERT M. BASTRESS &
JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 28 (1990)).193 Id. at 21. In a mediation context, this type of advocacy leads to the problems that
arise when the parties become fixated on their self-interest to the exclusion of everything
else. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
194 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 22.
195 An Oakland, California lawyer reports:
I was working as a volunteer at Legal Aid. A client came in reporting a dispute with his
neighbor. In the client's presence, I phoned the neighbor. After a long conversation, I
was able to settle the matter. I was very pleased with myself. When I hung up, I looked
across the desk to see my client fuming. "What's wrong?" I asked. He replied, "I didn't
want you to be nice to him."
Eugene Brott, quoted in ABA Journal E Report, Oct. 4, 2002.
196 Professor Douglas Yarn has suggested a very different presumption: that a good
lawyer should function as a good second in a duel.
In dueling, bad seconds were potentially lethal, but good seconds could avoid injury and
reconcile the disputants. In the contemporary context, it is not the court's judgment or
order that brings ruin, but the attorneys [sic]. In legal disputes, bad attorneys can cause
the client to incur considerable costs, win or lose, but good attorneys reduce the risks
and cost of litigation and facilitate settlement.
Yam, supra note 90, at 113.
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responsibility occurs, and the lawyer ends up behaving in a manner neither she
nor her client would embrace in the conduct of her own affairs. 197
Shaffer and Cochran's third approach is that of the lawyer as "guru." Here,
the lawyer is willing to make moral choices for the client. While the results may
be seen as more benign, the approach is nevertheless seen as objectionable
because it elevates the lawyer's moral viewpoint over that of the client. 198 Thus,
the ideal of client autonomy, prized among advocates of mediation and other
dispute resolution alternatives,199 is compromised. Similarly compromised is the
goal of client engagement and growth. The client, rather than performing as a
knowing participant in a communitarian enterprise, becomes an instrument of
the lawyer's moral agenda. In this sense, the lawyer as guru is only slightly less
objectionable than the lawyer as godfather.
Shaffer and Cochran's final model is that of the lawyer as "friend." In this
model, the lawyer serves as the client's partner in a moral inquiry in pursuit of
goodness. The lawyer helps the client to be a better person; "the lawyer and
client ... deal with moral issues that arise in representation in the way that
friends deal with moral issues." 200 This is the model favored by the authors, and
there is much to commend it. But I am neither so optimistic regarding the
opportunities for lawyers to engage in moral dialogue with their clients nor so
assured of my own morality (or skill) to think that I can make my client a better
person through my representation. I think that at best, lawyers can help and
197 This phenomenon was vividly portrayed in a sequence from a recent motion picture
documentary, Startup.com. See STARTUP.COM (Pennebaker Hegedus Films & Noujaim Films
2001). Tom, one of the two principal officers of a startup company, govworks, has been
asked to take a vacation in order to ease his way out of the company. Id. He informs his
partner that his lawyer has advised him not to take a vacation or to leave the office. Id. His
partner responds: "Well, I wish we weren't on this path. I understand you're following
counsel and you're doing what you need to do... and so, you know I would do the same
thing." Id.
Later on, Tom replies: "Please, please don't take my change in attitude as anything
personal. I still honestly have as first and foremost in my mind the interest of govworks [the
company], but not to the exclusion of doing what my own legal counsel suggests I should
do." Id.
198 Shaffer and Cochran's most prominent example of this approach is that of Atticus
Finch, the semi-fictitious character in the Harper Lee novel, To Kill a Mockingbird. SHAFFER
& COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 32-33. That this is seen as objectionable may surprise an
entire generation of lawyers (myself included) who grew up with Finch as their ideal and
inspiration.
199 See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 33-35 (1984); Welsh, Thinning Vision,
supra note 12, at 15-16.
200 SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 45.
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encourage their clients to act on their own best instincts. 20 1 And the best
opportunities to do this occur most often when lawyer and client are discussing,
as they must, the legitimate objectives of the client, the various dispute
resolution process choices available, the manner in which the chosen process is
to be carried out, and the manner in which they shall conduct themselves in the
process. 202
What is critical here is that the discussion occurs at all. Consider, for
example, the decision to have a dispute adjudicated, rather than resolved
through a more collaborative process like negotiation or mediation. People elect
adjudicative processes for a variety of reasons: they want a legally "correct"
decision; they want to hold their adversary accountable, whether or not she is
ultimately found liable; they want relief that only a court can provide; they
cannot psychologically accommodate the engagement required by a more
collaborative process. All of these may be legitimate reasons, and my purpose is
not to suggest that a choice of adjudication over a more collaborative
mechanism is necessarily wrong. What I will argue is that it should be a
conscious choice (rather than simply a default due to lack of discussion) and one
that takes into account as many considerations as the disputant might ultimately
find relevant. One would hope that among those considerations would be the
welfare of others, including that of the adversary and the community at large, to
the extent it is potentially impacted by the dispute. 20 3 Given the understandable
201 Gerald Williams has espoused a similar view in the context of the negotiation
process:
The negotiation process.., is not intended for lawyers to impose our values upon our
clients, but for us to help contain and channel our clients' energies in appropriate ways
until they have had enough time to see their own situations more clearly and to discover
for themselves what steps they may be willing to make.
Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 51.
202 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Must Lawyers Tell Clients About ADR?, ARB. J., June
1993, at 8, 8.
203 An emerging ethic of community oriented lawyering presents a "holistic" approach
in which the lawyer tries to reach beyond the immediate client's "presenting problem" to deal
with underlying problems based in the community. Roger Conner, Community Oriented
Lawyering: An Emerging Approach to Legal Practice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Jan. 2000, at
26, 27. Some examples:
" In Baltimore, a public interest law firm represents neighborhood organizations in
low income areas, initiating civil actions to close crack houses, helping incorporate
neighborhood groups and helping them develop comprehensive strategies, and
fashioning new causes of action to address the problem of abandoned properties.
Id. at 30.
* Major law firms in New York City, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles take on
entire neighborhoods as pro bono projects, helping them to close crack houses and
open neighborhood centers, and using novel strategies to stop gang intimidation.
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self-absorption of disputants at times of crisis, it should not be surprising if the
client does not raise this consideration herself. It is not inappropriate, however,
for the lawyer to raise it. 20 4
Certainly lawyer attitudes regarding conflict must play at least a subtle role
in process choices. 20 5 Much of the popular criticism of lawyers stems from a
perception that lawyers place a higher value on assertiveness than empathy. 206 It
is naYve to believe that such an attitude (particularly on the part of someone with
substantial persuasive powers) would have no bearing on client choices. 207 At
the very least, lawyers must be conscious of their own attitudes toward conflict,
lest they (as godfather or guru) supplant client autonomy. Recognizing that
neither lawyer nor client can (or, in the case of the client, should) fully suppress
her own attitude toward conflict, they should engage in open discussion of these
attitudes and their consequences for the dispute at hand. The appropriate process
choice is likely to be found at the intersection of these attitudes, the client's
underlying values, and the remedies legally available. By engaging the client in
a full and frank discussion regarding process choices and their consequences,
the lawyer prepares the client for the type of engagement conducive to the
Id. at 27-28, 30.
The Metropolitan Defender Service in Portland, Oregon, invests precious resources
on addiction and education specialists, to reduce recidivism and make clients truly
better off, rather than recycling them through the criminal system. Id. at 30-31.
204 Model Rule 2.1 states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2002). Comment 2 elaborates (ever so slightly): "Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor
as such [note the departure from the Shaffer/Cochran "lawyer as friend" model], moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how
the law will be applied." Id. cmt. 2.
For a discussion of how this "moral discourse" might be shaped, see SHAFFER &
COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 113-34.
205 If, for example, a lawyer felt greater comfort asserting a position in the formal
setting of a courtroom (or even one more step removed, through the filing of pleadings) than
by engaging in the empathic listening characteristic of mediation, it is hard to believe that
that lawyer would not gravitate toward litigation, client preferences notwithstanding. Other,
less competitive lawyers might too readily compromise a claim rather than engage in
adversarial disputing.
206 See, e.g., JESS M. BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES (1992) (collecting
quotes and jokes about lawyers). For a brief discussion of the role of empathy and
assertiveness in process choices, see supra note 78.
207 Practicing lawyers have told me that I am na'fve to think that law firms' interests in
their own financial well-being have little or no bearing on process choices. As obvious as this
may be to some, it is nevertheless a matter of grave concern.
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building of social capital.
Once a process choice is made, much work remains to be done. As we have
seen above, dispute resolution processes do not play themselves out on their
own. Adjudicative processes require the marshalling of evidence and argument;
more collaborative processes require genuine effort for the parties to reach
accord, and authentic engagement to build social capital. But is process alone
enough? Or must there be accord not only regarding the process to be
employed, but as to substantive values as well, if community is to be built
through conflict resolution? It is to that issue that we turn as we conclude our
discussion.
VI. CONCLUSION: IS PROCESS ALONE ENOUGH?
"It is by the light of reason that we interpret the signposts and make out the
landmarks along our way. "208
- Thomas Merton
Throughout this article, I have suggested that proper employment of process
to resolve conflict can have a salutary effect on community. But it is fair to ask
whether process alone is enough. Can the maintenance of civil discourse-
whether through principled use of adjudicatory processes or the engagement
characteristic of more consensual processes-build community in the absence of
common substantive values? My tentative conclusion is that it cannot. Process
can provide for civil discourse, and thereby can create an atmosphere conducive
to the building of community. It can serve as a tool. But shared substantive
values must remain the bricks and mortar of community. 20 9 Amitai Etzioni
writes:
The needed good order will be served by restoration of the civil (or civic)
society that many have called for recently, and is of merit in its own right, but
by itself will not suffice to provide the kind of order a good society requires.
"Civic order" is used to mean that people are civil to one another (that they do
not demonize their opponents, are willing to compromise, conduct reasoned
rather than impassioned discussions) and/or that a society should maintain a
fabric of mediating institutions to protect individuals from the government.
208 Bartleby.com, at http://www.bartleby.com/66/89/39389.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2002).
209 A cautionary note: Efforts at conciliation should not be abandoned because the
absence of common values is too readily presumed. See, e.g., Michelle LeBaron & Nike
Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in THE CONSENsus BUILDING
HANDBOOK 103 1, 1033-34 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (describing conciliation
effort involving pro-life and pro-choice advocates).
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Or-that the government should heed the citizens' preferences. I agree that the
civic order is part of the good order, but it is far too thin a concept; the civic
order is often defined mainly in terms of procedure, limited to the political
arena, or otherwise devoid of substantive values, as distinct from the concepts
of good around which the social order of good societies is centered. 2 10
Process can force people together. The compulsory process of the civil
courts, for example, can place people in the same room long enough to
adjudicate their disputes to a formal disposition. Likewise, even in the absence
of a mutual recognition of shared values, a skillful mediator can help warring
parties construct an agreement, a truce of sorts. But we should not confuse such
an agreement with the building of social capital.2 11 The notes will be played, but
they will not necessarily produce music. The musical metaphor may be
particularly appropriate. Jazz trumpeter Wynton Marsalis, an artist skilled in
interpreting America's "most important indigenous art form," 2 12 has said:
Today you go in to make a modem recording... [and they have] all this
technology. The bass plays first, then the drums come in later, then they track
the trumpet, then the singer comes in, then they ship the tape somewhere ...
none of the musicians have played together. You can't play jazz music that
way. In order for you to play jazz, you've got to listen to them. The music
forces you at all times to address what other people are thinking and for you to
interact with them with empathy and to deal with the process of working things
out... That's how our music really could teach what the meaning of American
democracy is.213
At times of conflict, formal process can contain disruption. It can maintain
equilibrium. But process alone cannot build community. Even more
collaborative processes, like mediation, will build no more than a superficial,
temporary truce unless the process is managed to allow the parties to discover a
common bond that is deeper than process alone.2 14 Often that bond will be
210 ETZIONI, GOLDEN RULE, supra note 7, at 14.
211 Likewise, while the intervention of skilled outsiders may move the process along,
the sustained commitment of community members is critical to the maintenance of social
capital. See, e.g., Susan L. Podziba, The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 743, 764-65 (Lawrence Susskind et a]. eds., 1999).
212 Ralph Ellison, Homage to Duke Ellington on His Birthday, in THE COLLECTED
ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON 676, 677 (John F. Callahan ed., 1995).
213 Wynton Marsalis, in JAZZ -A FILM BY KEN BURNS: EPISODE TEN-A
MASTERPIECE BY MIDNIGHT (Florentine Films 2000).
214 For a contrary view, we might look to Brian Palmer, a character study in Habits of
the Heart. BELLAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-8. To Brian, "[iut is through communication that
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found in shared experience-a shared history through which disputants
recognize in each other common elements of the human condition. 215 At its
best, a dispute resolution process will help people to discover their common
history and unearth commonly-held values. Often (all too often, it seems) shared
experience will be in the form of shared pain.216 In the end, social capital is the
product not of spontaneous combustion, but of history, experience, and effort.
And what remains -of process? Process is important, as is technique. One
must learn the fingering of a trumpet in order to make music. But there must be
something of substance underlying the process; something to touch the soul
after one admires the technique. Going through the motions and participating in
dispute resolution processes without real engagement will produce notes, but not
music. A pluralistic society, like a good jazz ensemble, requires the recognition
and appreciation of differences, and the will to work and play together. Marsalis
describes it in the following manner:
In American life... we have all of these different agendas; we-have
conflict all the time and we're attempting to achieve harmony through conflict.
It seems strange to say that-but it's like an argument that you have with the
intent to work something out, not an argument that you have with the intent to
argue. 217
And that's what jazz music is-[we] ... have musicians, and they're all
standing on the bandstand, each one has their personality and their agenda.
Invariably they're going to play something that you would not play, so you
have to learn when to say a little something, when to get out of the way. So you
have that question of the integrity, the intent, the will to play together-that's
what jazz music is. So you have your self, your individual expression, and then
people have a chance to resolve their differences, since there is no larger moral ideal in terms
of which conflicts can be resolved... [For Brian,] [slolving conflicts becomes a matter of
technical problem solving, not moral decision." Id. at 7. This view has been described by
Judge Harry Edwards as "the broken telephone" theory of dispute resolution. Edwards, supra
note 97, at 678-79.
215 The Kalahari Bushmen described by William Ury are so successful at containing
disputes because their community has been built through a series of bonds based on hundreds
of years of shared experience. Ury describes "the pervasive habits of cooperation, sharing,
and reciprocity" characteristic of such small-scale nomadic societies. URY, supra note 60, at
39.
2 16 Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, President George W. Bush
observed, "Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together
and facing danger together. Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger
than cynicism. Many have discovered again that even in tragedy-especially in tragedy-God
is near." President's State of the Union Address, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. D3, D1O (Jan. 29,
2002).
217 Marsalis, supra note 213.
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you have how you negotiate that expression in the context of that group and it's
exactly like democracy.2 18
The ultimate promise for dispute resolution is that it can harness and nurture
the will to play together so that society is more than the sum total of disparate
notes, but rather a cohesive-albeit sometimes discordant-tune. 219 There often
exists a natural reluctance for people to engage one another, especially when
engagement involves somebody new or different. But once we engage in a
common enterprise-a football team, ajazz ensemble, a community playground
project-differences practically cease to be a factor. We develop a common
history that enables us to work, play and speak together.
This article is rife with comments about what people should do to foster a
more communitarian society. 220 The language is hortatory because we cannot
legislate communitarian attitudes and conduct any more than we can legislate
jazz. Efforts to compel civic-mindedness have always ended in failure, if not
outright repression. 221 Social capital can be orchestrated, but it cannot be
fabricated. Flags appeared all over America after September 11, 2001 as a
spontaneous outpouring of patriotism, not as the consequence of an imperial
decree. Just as the multiculturalism of American society, combined with free
institutions, created an atmosphere conducive to jazz, so may we, through the
processes of conflict resolution, create an atmosphere conducive to those
expressions of community inherent in our nature.
218id.
219 Sometimes a discord sounds just right-as listeners of George Gershwin, Charlie
Parker, and Marsalis will attest. That jazz-America's defining music, and one of its great
gifts to the world-thrives on elements of discord demonstrates that conflict is always with
us, but that the proper management of discord can produce something of value and, at times,
great art.
220 To those who would say that this article is also rife with an optimism bordering on
naivet6, I plead guilty, but would suggest, as others have, that with the events of September
11, 2001 the age of postmodern cynicism has come to an end. See supra note 213.
221 Devices more conducive to communitarianism are demonstrated by the Kalahari
Bushmen described by Professor Ury. When persistently asked whether they had headmen,
one of them responded, "[o]f course we have headmen! In fact, we are all headmen. Each one
of us is headman over himself'" URY, supra note 61, at 4.
